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I examine the relationship between retail market competition and wholesale contracting patterns. To do so, I
analyze the subcontracting behavior of funeral homes (retailers) and crematories (wholesalers) in the Minnesota
funeral industry. Exploiting detailed data on wholesale and retail quantities, subcontracting patterns, consumer
and establishment locations, and retail pricing, I estimate a model that predicts pricing, consumer funeral home
choice, and vertical relationships between funeral homes and crematories. I ﬁnd that funeral homes seeking
wholesale cremation services are signiﬁcantly less likely to subcontract with crematories belonging to ﬁrms that
are direct retail market competitors. The estimated aversion to subcontracting with competitors is greater for
funeral homes with fewer proximate crematories. This is consistent with foreclosure by integrated crematories.
Estimates suggest that independent crematories enjoy seven percent larger markups on average than they would
in the absence of strategic considerations in wholesale contracting. Prices and allocations in the retail market are
also aﬀected since funeral homes located near crematories owned by competitors incur additional transportation
costs in using more distant crematories. Counterfactual analysis indicates that funeral homes with few crematories
nearby (that are owned by retail competitors) bear additional costs ranging from $161 to $203 per body on average,
or seven to nine percent of the retail price. Half of this cost impact is transmitted to consumers, resulting in a
four percent retail price increase in these markets on average.
1 Introduction
Firms commonly outsource business functions to take advantage of economies of scale, scope, or specialized expertise.
However, little empirical evidence exists evaluating the importance of strategic considerations in ﬁrm subcontracting
choices. In this paper, I analyze the relationship between retail market competition and wholesale contracting in
the cremation segment of the Minnesota funeral industry. The market for cremation services is an ideal setting for
the identiﬁcation of strategic considerations in vertical contracting. All funeral homes oﬀer retail cremation services
to consumers, but only a fraction own the equipment required to perform cremation. Funeral homes belonging to
ﬁrms that do not own cremation equipment must select an independent crematory or a vertically integrated ﬁrm to
provide wholesale cremation services. Comprised of both funeral homes and crematories, vertically integrated ﬁrms
are potential retail market competitors to funeral homes seeking wholesale services. Because funeral homes generally
incur transportation costs to the crematory, denial of service by integrated ﬁrms to unintegrated competitors could
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1substantially raise rivals’ costs in regions with few crematories. The market for cremation services is geographically
segmented at both the retail and wholesale levels, so increased costs may be transmitted to consumers.1
The market for cremation services is also an appropriate environment for this analysis because wholesale cremation
services are a commodity from the perspective of retail consumers. Although crematories may diﬀer in terms
of the ease of transfer and general convenience at which they oﬀer their services to funeral directors, the ﬁnal
product received by consumers does not vary with the crematory used. Aside from the potential price eﬀect, retail
consumer demand is exogenous to the funeral home’s choice of wholesale cremation supplier. This diﬀers from some
manufacturing industries in which consumers or retailers have speciﬁc demands as to supply chain origins, as well
as the healthcare industry, where the patient’s insurance may dictate provider or physician subcontracting choices
(Ho, 2007).
Using detailed data on subcontracting patterns, wholesale and retail quantities, consumer and establishment
locations, and retail pricing, I predict consumer funeral home choice and vertical relationships between funeral
homes and crematories.2 At the retail level, I allow consumer funeral home valuations to depend upon proximity,
demographics, observed funeral home attributes (including retail price), and unobserved quality. I ﬁnd that proximity
is the key driver of consumer funeral home choice and use it to gauge the degree of competition between funeral
homes. In estimating wholesale demand for cremation services, I allow retail market competition, transportation
costs to the crematory, and unobserved quality to inﬂuence crematory choice by unintegrated funeral homes. I
combine estimates from both discrete choice demand models with funeral home and crematory pricing optimality
conditions to infer markups as well as marginal cost components. Using parameter estimates, I run a counterfactual
to determine the impact of strategic considerations in wholesale contracting on equilibrium prices and allocations.
Retail market competition appears to have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on wholesale contracting. Unintegrated funeral
homes are less than half (0.42) as likely to contract with a crematory owned by a retail market competitor than a
similarly located crematory not owned by a competitor. Across all markets, the monetary equivalent of the estimated
“distaste” for forming vertical relationships with retail market competitors is $124 on average. When I permit the
impact of retail market competition to vary with wholesale market thickness, funeral homes with fewer proximate
crematories are less likely to subcontract with competitor ﬁrms. This is consistent with foreclosure by integrated
crematories.3 On average, the estimated cost of contracting with a competitor is $609 for funeral homes with one
local crematory and $373 for those with two crematories located nearby. Integrated crematories are less able to raise
rivals’ costs in markets where funeral homes have more options for wholesale service provision.
Unintegrated funeral homes’ decreased propensity to form wholesale supply relationships with competitors has a
number of implications. For funeral homes located near a crematory owned by a retail market competitor, marginal
1In focusing on a geographically segmented industry, I follow Syverson (2004) and Hortacsu and Syverson (2007).
2From death certiﬁcates, I obtain the source funeral home and destination crematory for each body. Therefore, vertical links between
funeral homes and crematories are directly observed.
3Throughout this paper, (upstream) foreclosure refers to actions that reduce access to a supplier, as described by Tirole (1988).
2costs are increased by the additional transportation costs to a more distant supplier. While this increase is presumably
smaller than the ﬁxed cost of vertically integrating through equipment purchase or the cost of working with a
competitor, it nonetheless aﬀects equilibrium allocations. Since the retail market is imperfectly competitive and
highly localized, retail prices at unintegrated funeral homes reﬂect these additional costs. These costs are above
and beyond those incurred by unintegrated funeral homes due to double marginalization. This process is facilitated
by extensive wholesale and retail market power. On average, estimated wholesale markups are approximately 80
percent of the estimated wholesale price. Median retail markups are 67 percent of the retail price for unintegrated
funeral homes and 79 percent of the retail price for integrated ﬁrms.
Counterfactual estimates indicate that the aggregate retail price impact of this decreased contracting propensity
is modest at $5 per body on average. However, this ﬁgure masks substantial heterogeneity across funeral homes.
Funeral homes with few proximate crematories (that are owned by retail competitors) incur additional costs ranging
from seven to nine percent of the retail price, or $161 to $203, on average. Half of the increase in marginal cost arising
from “distaste” for working with competitors is transmitted to consumers in these markets. By reducing wholesale
competition, impediments to forming vertical supply relationships with horizontal competitors also inﬂate wholesale
margins. According to counterfactual estimates, independent wholesalers enjoy seven percent larger markups on
average than they would in the absence of strategic considerations in vertical contracting.
In evaluating the impact of retail market competition on wholesale contracting, I contribute to the empirical
literature examining vertical foreclosure.4 I directly estimate the propensity to form vertical relationships with retail
rivals using detailed data on subcontracting patterns. By examining subcontracting patterns among establishments,
I am able to account for denial of service, quality degradation, wholesale price discrimination by crematories, unin-
tegrated funeral homes’ desire not to raise rivals’ proﬁts, or any other impediment to vertical contracting. In looking
explicitly at vertical relationships among ﬁrms, my work is similar to Chipty (2001), who ﬁnds that vertically in-
tegrated cable operators exclude competitor program services from their distribution networks. My work diﬀers
from other papers that indirectly test for foreclosure by examining price eﬀects. Hastings and Gilbert (2005) link
retail competition in the gasoline market with wholesale market foreclosure using variation in the extent of vertical
integration within a market resulting from a merger. They ﬁnd that the (merged) integrated ﬁrm charges higher
wholesale gasoline prices in more competitive retail markets and that, more generally, wholesale gasoline prices are
higher in markets that are more integrated. In contrast, Hortacsu and Syverson (2007) ﬁnd no evidence of foreclosure
in the cement and ready-mixed concrete industries. Retail prices for ready-mixed concrete fall when markets become
more integrated, reﬂecting, they argue, a tendency for integrated ﬁrms to be more productive.
I also contribute to the literature examining the funeral industry. Limited to date, this literature has investigated
retail market responses to regulatory intervention. Harrington and Krynski (2002) test for demand induction in
4The theoretical literature is quite extensive and is reviewed by by Riordan (forthcoming), among others.
3response to regulation. They ﬁnd that cremation rates are lower in states that require funeral directors to invest in
additional training or equipment. The authors argue that this is the result of funeral directors urging consumers to
purchase more costly funeral options to recoup additional investment. Chevalier and Scott Morton (2007) examine
the eﬀect of state regulations governing participation in the retail casket market on funeral directors’ pricing of
goods and services. They ﬁnd evidence that funeral directors raise service prices and lower goods prices when open
participation in the funeral goods market is permitted. My focus on inter-ﬁrm relationships within the industry is a
departure from this literature.
In the next section, I brieﬂy describe the relevant institutional features of the market for cremation services
as well as the data sources. After performing a descriptive analysis of the data, I develop a theoretical model
that predicts consumer funeral home choice, crematory choice by unintegrated funeral homes, and pricing. I then
estimate the model, exploiting variation in transportation costs and contracting patterns to determine retail and
wholesale markups in the absence of wholesale pricing information. Using model estimates, a counterfactual analysis
is performed to determine the eﬀect of strategic considerations in wholesale contracting on allocations and prices in
both the wholesale and retail markets.
2 Industry Environment and Data Sources
2.1 The Market for Cremation Services
The cremation segment of the funeral industry has a structure that is particularly well-suited for the identiﬁcation of
strategic considerations in vertical contracting.5 A diagram of the market structure is shown in Figure 1. The market
for cremation services consists of two components: a retail segment comprised of funeral homes that serve consumers
directly and a wholesale market in which funeral homes and crematories interact. Although funeral establishments
oﬀer both cremation and burial options to consumers, only a fraction of funeral homes own cremation equipment
on-site or at other establishments within the ﬁrm.6 Throughout this paper, I will refer to ﬁrms that own cremation
equipment and their constituent establishments as “integrated.” Unintegrated funeral homes, those which do not
have access to equipment internally, subcontract the work to an external provider of wholesale cremation services.
In most states, providers include both independent crematories and ﬁrms that own funeral homes.7
In selecting a provider, an unintegrated funeral home has three potential considerations: transportation costs, the
wholesale price (known as the crematory fee), and relationship-speciﬁc concerns. Since the funeral home is generally
responsible for transporting the body to the crematory, wholesale providers may derive market power from horizontal
5The industry is described in Laderman (2003). Prothero (2001) discusses cremation in particular. A historical account of industry
pricing is provided by Gebhart (1928).
6Theoretically, it is possible for a funeral home not to oﬀer cremation services, but all funeral homes in my sample did so (even
traditionally Jewish funeral homes).
7Funeral directors are legally prohibited from operating crematories in some states. As of 2006, these states included Maine, Mas-
sachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and Michigan. Source: Cremation Association of America
4diﬀerentiation by location. All else equal, unintegrated funeral homes would prefer to minimize transportation costs
by selecting the nearest provider. Variation in wholesale price as well as crematory-speciﬁc considerations drive
unintegrated funeral homes to choose more distant suppliers. Crematory-speciﬁc considerations may relate to the
competitive environment in the retail market. Since integrated ﬁrms own both funeral homes and crematories,
unintegrated funeral homes potentially subcontract with retail market competitors. Anecdotal evidence indicates
that funeral directors rarely engage in wholesale contracting relationships with retail market competitors. I ﬁnd
empirical support for this assertion which is discussed in the next section.
Because retail market power is extensive, strategic considerations in wholesale contracting may aﬀect retail pricing
since higher costs may be passed on to consumers. Funeral directors pay a per-body fee for wholesale cremation
services, with no discounts based on volume, and do not generally sign contracts with crematories.8 Although I do not
observe the wholesale prices charged by crematories in my data, they average less than $300 industry-wide. Charges
associated with transportation to the crematory, professional services, removal, death certiﬁcates, and containers
constitute the balance of the ﬁnal retail cost of cremation to consumers.9
2.2 Data Sources
In order to examine vertical relationships in this industry, I compiled data from a number of sources. The richness of
the data allows for the examination of many aspects of consumer and ﬁrm behavior. The data include all individuals
dying in the state of Minnesota, residing in Minnesota at the time of death, and using a funeral home in Minnesota
from January 2002 through September 2006. Drawn from death certiﬁcates provided by the Minnesota Department
of Health, the data contain detailed demographic information, residence location, decedent location at the time of
death, funeral home selected, method of disposition, and crematory used (when applicable). Of 169,026 decedents
fulﬁlling the above criteria, 61,747 were cremated. The cremation rate of 36.5 percent is slightly above the national
average of 30.88 percent in 2004, the middle of the period studied. Quarterly demand for funeral services by method
of disposition is shown in Figure 2.10
Location and ownership information for both funeral homes and crematories was obtained from the Mortuary
Science Section of the Minnesota Department of Health in August 2006. License numbers and establishment names
were linked to information reported on death certiﬁcates. Multiple license numbers associated with the same address
were treated as one establishment. Dates of operation were inferred using reported death dates for decedents processed
8In focusing on an industry without long term contracting or ﬁrm speciﬁc investment, my work is similar to Gil and Hartmann
(2007) who examine laundry services. However, they examine the decision to vertically integrate, whereas I examine supplier choice by
unintegrated ﬁrms.
9Source: Personal correspondence with the Cremation Association of North America. In my data, the cost of direct cremation services
to consumers, exclusive of container costs, was $2173 on average (median $2109).
10Although the disposition decision is not examined in this paper, results from a probit of the disposition decision on consumer
demographics are reported in Table A1, located in the Ancillary Table Appendix. Jointly estimating funeral home and disposition choice
is theoretically plausible, but implementation would be challenging. Ultimately, estimating such a model would require an instrument for
burial price (as well as cremation price). I lack a clean instrument for burial price. Additionally, burial prices only constitute a portion
of the total cost of choosing burial. A casket and a plot (or mausoleum space) must also be acquired. Since I lack information regarding
individual consumer choices from the menu of funeral services, burial price is a poor proxy for the actual cost of that selection.
5by that establishment. Additional information, such as corporate ownership, trade association membership, and
ethnic or minority focus, was acquired from funeral home licensing information or websites. These data are augmented
by price data that I collected through a survey of all Minnesota funeral homes in Spring 2007.11 Funeral home and
crematory locations were geocoded to the exact address. Decedent residence addresses were linked to the zip code
centroid due to the large number of individuals. Refer to the Data Appendix for details.
The funeral home and the crematory named on the death certiﬁcate constitute a clear vertical link in the market
for cremation services. Using this information, the crematory to which the most bodies were sent was determined
on a quarterly basis for each funeral home. Most funeral homes utilize one crematory at a given point in time; the
median percentage of funeral home bodies supplied to the principal cremation provider was 100 percent (mean 95.4
percent) across all quarters.12 The principal cremation supplier was not identiﬁed for 5.9 percent (412 of 6986) of
funeral home*quarters. It is possible that these funeral homes used out-of-state crematories. Using this metric, 46
percent of funeral homes changed crematories at least once.13 The ephemeral nature of supply relationships is not
surprising given the absence of monitoring concerns, switching costs, demand uncertainty, and relationship-speciﬁc
investment in this market.14
3 Descriptive Analysis
In this section, I motivate the empirical model by describing the key elements of the data. These include relative
establishment location, the distance travelled by consumers to funeral homes, retail pricing dispersion, and the
relationship between crematory integration status and subcontracting.
3.1 Descriptive Statistics: Firm Organization
Despite recent national trends toward consolidation, the Minnesota funeral industry remains relatively disaggregated.
Firm size statistics are reported in Table 1. The majority of ﬁrms are single-establishment. Of the 220 ﬁrms
operating funeral homes, 115 operated only one funeral home (and 49 operated two funeral homes). Firm size by
integration status is shown in Table 2. The 36 vertically integrated ﬁrms have more funeral homes on average than
their unintegrated counterparts, but just under a third of them are single-establishment. Although most ﬁrms are
comprised solely of unintegrated funeral homes, there are also integrated ﬁrms that provide wholesale cremation
services to other ﬁrms, integrated ﬁrms that do not provide cremation services to other ﬁrms (exclusive dealing), and
11Price lists were obtained via email and telephone requests. Although federal law does not mandate that funeral establishments mail
price lists in response to inquiries, the vast majority did so. Funeral homes, however, are required by federal mandate to answer pricing
questions over the phone. Refer to the Data Appendix for details regarding the price survey.
12A portion of the balance might be explained by switching suppliers within the quarter, which occurred in six percent of funeral
home*quarters.
13There were 391 switches in the 6574 funeral home*quarters for which the principal supplier was identiﬁed.
14Monteverde and Teece (1982) ﬁnd that ﬁrms are more likely to vertically integrate into a key input when technical knowledge is ﬁrm
speciﬁc. Joskow (1987) ﬁnds that relationship-speciﬁc investment is associated longer contract durations.
6independently-owned crematories. Of the 49 crematories in the sample as of 2006, 40 belong to ﬁrms that operate
funeral homes.15 Of those 40 integrated crematories, 36 are co-located with a funeral home.
During the period under examination, there was considerable entry in the wholesale market, but the number of
funeral homes remained relatively stable. Continuing an earlier expansion trend, the number of crematories increased
from 36 to 49.16 All but one of the 13 entrants were integrated. In the retail market, 29 funeral homes entered,
30 funeral homes exited, and 18 funeral homes both entered and exited.17 Histograms displaying the number of
crematories and funeral homes in operation by quarter are located in the Ancillary Plot Appendix (Figures A1 and
A2). Throughout my analysis, I control for funeral home and crematory entry and exit.
Establishment locations are shown in Figure 3, and summary measures of relative establishment locations are
reported in Table 3.18 The geographic distribution of establishments reﬂects population density. All independent
crematories are located within 25 miles of another crematory, whereas some integrated crematories are more isolated.
Predictably, funeral homes belonging to multi-establishment ﬁrms tend to be concentrated geographically. The
median distance to the nearest same-ﬁrm funeral home is 10.7 miles and the median distance to the most distant
same-ﬁrm funeral home is 22.3 miles.19
3.2 Descriptive Statistics: Retail Market
3.2.1 Consumers
Since I observe prices as of Spring 2007, I restrict the decedent dataset to individuals choosing cremation who died
in the most recent quarter for which I observe decedent information, the third quarter of 2006.20 The distribution
of distances between decedent residences and selected funeral homes, partitioned by whether the residence is located
within city limits, is shown in Figure 4. The retail market for cremation services is highly localized. Given time
constraints and the emotional state of the consumer, implied travel and search costs may be considerable. Among
cremation consumers, 30.4 percent used the closest funeral home to the decedent’s residence while 14.1 percent used
15Of the nine independently-owned crematories, most appear to be located on the grounds of or adjacent to a cemetery. Three ﬁrms
own multiple crematories - two ﬁrms own two crematories each, and one ﬁrm owns three. There was some ambiguity in reporting for
multi-crematory ﬁrms. See the Data Appendix for details.
16Except in estimating retail demand, establishment operation status is deﬁned quarterly throughout this paper. Minnesota began
licensing crematories in 1997. There were 23 crematories licensed at that time; thus, 13 crematories entered in the ﬁve years preceding
the period of study (just as there were 13 entrants in the almost-ﬁve-year study period).
17These ﬁgures were obtained by inferring entry and exit directly from the death certiﬁcates. During my price survey, I discovered that
some funeral homes that exited using my deﬁnition actually had not. It appears that some ﬁrms that own multiple funeral homes do not
have business oﬃces on all sites. In some cases, the establishment number on the death certiﬁcate might not reﬂect the establishment
at which the service was performed. This appears to be the case for 18 funeral homes (11 of which exhibited both entry and exit by
my deﬁnition). By necessity, I use the dates of operation implied by the death certiﬁcates in constructing consumer choice sets and in
any calculations involving establishment output measures. When constructing the competitoru,r,t regressor described later, I use the
additional information regarding operation obtained during the survey.
18These statistics control for entry and exit, deﬁned quarterly. An establishment is considered to be in operation if it processed a
positive number of bodies in that quarter.
19The mean value for most distant funeral home, 52.9 miles, is inﬂuenced by a regional (privately held) consolidator that owns 32
funeral homes.
20The price survey was performed from March 2007 - May 2007. The most recent price revision for the vast majority of ﬁrms predated
March 2007.
7the second closest funeral home. Although both rural and urban consumers tend to patronize funeral homes located
nearby, the distribution is more diﬀuse for rural consumers. When the distance travelled is exceptionally large, it is
likely that the decedent residence is not a good measure of the consumer’s location. In order to mitigate this potential
source of measurement error, I omit consumers in the upper tail of each distribution in estimation. I restrict the
choice set for decedents residing within city limits to funeral homes located within 25 miles of the residence. Since
the distribution for rural consumers is more diﬀuse, I extend their choice set to 35 miles. These search radii are
slightly greater than the 90th percentile of actual distance travelled for each group.21 Decedents who patronized
funeral homes beyond the bounds of their choice set were dropped from the sample.
In estimating consumer funeral home choice, I allow the eﬀect of distance to vary with demographics. Demographic
descriptors are listed in Table 4, and summary measures for decedents included in the estimation sample are shown
in Table 5. The sample is racially homogenous; approximately 96 percent of cremated decedents are white (non-
Hispanic). Consequently, unobserved demographic characteristics aﬀecting funeral home choice that are correlated
with race, such as religion, are unlikely to vary across consumers.22 Approximately 65 percent of decedents were
born in Minnesota.23 This lack of mobility suggests that concerns with subsequent out-of-state shipping are less
likely to drive consumer or ﬁrm behavior.
3.2.2 Funeral Homes: Non-Price Descriptors
In estimation, I permit consumer funeral home choice to be aﬀected by observed funeral home characteristics,
attributes of the Census tract on which the funeral home is located, and measures of pricing transparency and
general consumer outreach (see Table 4). Summary statistics for the 443 funeral homes in operation during the
third quarter of 2006 are shown in Table 6. In contrast to other states, publicly-traded funeral conglomerates
own very few establishments in Minnesota (2.3 percent), suggesting that owners are directly involved in day-to-
day business operations. Despite federal pricing disclosure requirements, funeral homes exhibited great variation in
pricing transparency in response to my survey.24 Extensive transparency statistics are shown in Table A2, located
in the Ancillary Table Appendix. Although 62.8 percent of funeral homes had an internet presence, only 2.7 percent
posted prices on the web.
21The 90th percentiles for urban and rural consumers are 23 and 33 miles respectively. With these restrictions, urban residents have an
average of 65 funeral homes in their choice set (median 89), while those living outside of city limits have an average of 23 funeral homes
(median 12). I use the exact death date on the consumer’s death certiﬁcate to deﬁne the choice set. For this estimation, funeral home
operation status is evaluated daily. If the death date of the individual falls between the ﬁrst and ﬁnal death dates of bodies processed by
the funeral home, the funeral home is included in the consumer choice set. This diﬀers from establishment and ﬁrm integration status,
which are deﬁned quarterly, and subsequent supplier choice regressions, where supplier operation status is deﬁned quarterly.
22My focus on cremation consumers further mitigates concerns arising from unobserved religious preference since adherents to the
Catholic and Jewish faiths are less likely to be cremated.
23Minnesota ranked 12th in terms of percent of population born in state in the 2000 Census.
24Funeral homes are mandated by the federal Funeral Rule to provide a price list to consumers who request pricing information in
person. The price list includes itemized information (plus eﬀective date) and other disclosures. The Funeral Rule (16 CFR Part 453)
is available on the Federal Trade Commission’s website at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/rulemaking/funeral/16cfr453.pdf. Although funeral
homes are not required to mail price lists in response to telephone inquiries, federal law dictates that funeral homes must share pricing
information over the phone when asked for pricing information.
83.2.3 Retail Pricing
For my analysis, I restrict attention to the prices of basic funeral services: direct cremation and immediate burial.25
By focusing on basic services, I hope to mitigate the role of unobserved product heterogeneity.26 Although actual
consumer choices from the menu of services (aside from the method of disposition) are not observed, I take these
prices to be reﬂective of the funeral home’s overall price level. Price summary statistics are shown in Table 7.
Prices exhibited great variation, suggesting considerable vertical or horizontal diﬀerentiation across funeral homes.
Immediate burial prices ranged from $475 to $4000, while direct cremation prices ranged from $850 to $3910. Among
multi-establishment ﬁrms, prices are generally set at the ﬁrm level. Of 105 multi-establishment ﬁrms in my dataset,
93 (89 percent) priced uniformly across all establishments within the ﬁrm.
Vertically integrated funeral homes charge more for burial than unintegrated funeral homes on average, but
median cremation prices for integrated and unintegrated funeral homes are approximately equal (see Figure 5).
Higher burial prices for integrated funeral homes may reﬂect both less competition in the retail market and perceived
quality diﬀerentials. As shown in Table 8, unintegrated funeral homes have slightly more retail market competitors
on average than integrated funeral homes, which might lead to lower retail prices. It is also possible that unobserved
traits aﬀecting consumer choice, such as the quality of the building, are correlated with integration status. The
absence of a pricing diﬀerential in cremation prices may reﬂect lower costs to integrated ﬁrms. Examining relative
pricing patterns controls for the eﬀect of unobserved funeral home characteristics on absolute price levels. Figure 6
displays the relationship between burial and cremation prices by ﬁrm integration status. The plot, which permits
within-establishment price comparisons, is consistent with the aggregate pricing statistics; vertically integrated ﬁrms
charge relatively less for cremation than burial.
As discussed earlier, transportation costs to the crematory are incurred by the funeral home, so the distance
to the principal cremation supplier is is an observable source of variation in marginal costs. Table 9 presents the
results of regressing service prices on the distance to the principal cremation supplier, controlling for observed funeral
home characteristics. As expected, the distance to the principal cremation supplier is signiﬁcant and positive in the
cremation price regression; each additional mile to the principal cremation supplier is associated with a $6.67 increase
in retail cremation prices. Estimated transportation costs are not signiﬁcant in explaining burial prices, suggesting
that this relationship reﬂects costs to the funeral home of providing cremation services and is not an artifact of
spurious correlation.
On average, funeral homes located in more densely populated areas charge less for both burial and cremation
services. Marketing outreach appears relevant for burial prices but not for cremation prices, with greater outreach
25Most of the time, direct cremation prices did not include the container or the crematory fee, and immediate burial prices were
exclusive of the container. Prices used in estimation account for reporting diﬀerences. See the Data Appendix for details.
26Both direct cremation and immediate burial include only basic services. There is no funeral ceremony. According to my discussions
with funeral directors, the number of consumers choosing direct cremation is non-negligible, but immediate burial is not commonly
chosen.
9associated with lower prices. Compared to funeral homes which provided information after multiple phone contacts,
those posting burial prices online charge $718 less on average while establishments that responded to internet price
inquiries charge $392 less. Further reﬂecting the negative transparency-price relation, funeral homes responding to
the ﬁrst phone call posted burial prices of $173 less on average, though the result was not statistically signiﬁcant.
The third column of Table 9 shows results from regressing the ratio of cremation to burial prices on a number
of funeral home descriptors.27 The impact of ﬁrm integration status on relative cremation price reﬂects the pattern
shown in Figure 6. Cremation is relatively less expensive at funeral homes belonging to vertically integrated ﬁrms
(by 17 percent of the burial price). The relative price of cremation also increases with the distance from the funeral
home to the principal cremation supplier.
3.3 Descriptive Statistics: Wholesale Market
The subcontracting behavior of unintegrated funeral homes suggests that retail market competition inﬂuences whole-
sale contracting. Across all quarters, the nearest crematory is selected 57.6 percent of the time if it is independent,
but only eight percent of the time if it is owned by a retail market competitor (and 33.1 percent of the time if the
crematory is integrated and not owned by a competitor).28 This pattern exists despite the fact that independent
crematories are more likely to be located near other crematories than integrated crematories. Although 61.2 percent
of unintegrated funeral homes use a vertically integrated crematory, this is relatively small given the composition of
crematory organizational form (40 integrated versus nine independent).
Table 10 presents summary statistics by crematory organizational form. Independent crematories have higher
output than integrated crematories on average. Median values indicate that crematory capacity constraints are non-
binding, with daily output of less than one body per work day.29 On average, independent crematories have about
twice as many subcontractors as integrated crematories, potentially reﬂecting their tendency to be located in areas
more densely populated by unintegrated funeral homes.
Among integrated crematories, the percent of bodies originating within the ﬁrm varies substantially. Six crema-
tories provide services only to funeral homes within their ﬁrm.30 The remaining 34 integrated crematories provide
wholesale cremation services to other ﬁrms. Figure 7 shows integrated crematory body sourcing. On average, approx-
imately two-thirds of bodies processed by integrated crematories originate at same-ﬁrm funeral homes. Heterogeneity
in sourcing composition is not merely a scale phenomenon. Within the subset of high-output crematory*quarters,
there exist both crematories that generally source bodies externally and crematories that are primarily self-servicing.
27Hence a negative sign reﬂects a lower relative cremation price.
28A ﬁrm is considered to be a competitor if it owns a funeral home located within ﬁve miles of the unintegrated funeral home.
29Quarterly capacity is 260 bodies per retort, not accounting for equipment failure or weekend work. I obtained this ﬁgure by assuming
that a quarter consists of 13 work weeks. According to industry sources, it takes approximately 2.5 hours to process one body, with a
maximum capacity of four bodies per day per retort. Although I do not observe the number of retorts per crematory, output ﬁgures
imply that some crematories own multiple retorts. It is illegal to process multiple bodies in a retort simultaneously.
30Of the six crematories that engage in exclusive dealing, ﬁve are also recent entrants.
10In estimating wholesale demand, I use unintegrated funeral home crematory choices from all quarters in the
dataset.31 I model the supplier decision at the funeral home level since there appears to be variation in supplier
choice within unintegrated ﬁrms. The choice set consists of all Minnesota crematories, both independent and those
belonging to integrated ﬁrms, in operation during that quarter. I further restrict the set of potential suppliers to
those crematories that do not engage in exclusive dealing, as deﬁned above. Funeral homes selecting a supplier that
cannot be identiﬁed are dropped from the sample.
The set of regressors includes the distance to the cremation provider, an indicator for whether the crematory is
a retail market competitor, and crematory ﬁxed eﬀects. I deﬁne competitoru,r,t = 1 if the ﬁrm that owns cremation
provider r owns a funeral home which is located within ﬁve miles of unintegrated funeral home u in quarter t. The
median distance between a cremated decedent’s residence and the selected funeral home is four miles (see Table 3),
so using a ﬁve mile cutoﬀ permits suﬃcient competitive intensity.32 Summary statistics for the estimation samples
are given in Table 11.
As discussed earlier, integrated funeral homes generally use crematories belonging to the ﬁrm. Using supplier
choices of integrated funeral homes for 2006, principal suppliers were outside of the ﬁrm in 32 of 1036 funeral
home*quarters (3 percent). In 29 of these instances, the funeral homes in question belonged to the same large,
geographically-dispersed ﬁrm. Consequently, only crematory choice by unintegrated funeral homes will be modeled
and estimated in the sections that follow.
In summary, the following key facts may be ascertained from the data. The Minnesota funeral industry is
disaggregated, with little ownership by publicly-traded ﬁrms. Thus, owners are likely involved in daily funeral home
operations and can react to changes in the competitive climate. Consumers overwhelmingly select funeral homes
located near their residences, suggesting that the retail market is geographically segmented. Retail cremation prices,
which are quite variable, reﬂect costs. In the wholesale market, funeral homes seeking cremation services appear to
favor independent crematories over those belonging to integrated ﬁrms. Within the set of integrated crematories,
unintegrated funeral homes are more likely to contract with those that are not direct retail market competitors.
4 Theoretical Model of Pricing and Demand
To understand how competition aﬀects wholesale contracting patterns and ultimately retail prices and allocations, I
require a model of both pricing and demand. In this section, I describe a model that predicts wholesale and retail
markups when wholesale prices are unobserved.33 Both funeral homes and crematories derive market power from
31I will ultimately estimate a conditional logit model. With this model, demand elasticities are a function of the market shares.
Substantial entry in the wholesale market for cremation services implies that market shares are changing through time, so assuming that
the price elasticity is constant across all periods is not innocuous.
32This cutoﬀ is somewhat arbitrary but does not appear to be qualitatively important. See Table A3 in the Appendix for an examination
of robustness.
33Villas Boas (2007) similarly infers markups in a vertical structure absent wholesale price data. She uses variation in input prices
and retail prices to identify markups. Instead, I rely upon cross-sectional variation in transportation costs across retail and wholesale
11horizontal diﬀerentiation by location. My speciﬁcation allows the cost of subcontracting with a particular crematory
to vary according to whether the ﬁrms are retail market competitors. Ownership, relative establishment location,
and integration status are taken as given throughout this analysis.
4.1 Retail Market
In the retail market, I assume that a Nash-Bertrand equilibrium exists in retail prices, with prices selected at the
ﬁrm level. For ease of exposition, I further assume that all unintegrated ﬁrms consist of one funeral home and that
all integrated ﬁrms consist of one funeral home and one crematory. The multi-establishment case follows directly
from aggregating proﬁts across funeral homes and crematories.34
4.1.1 Consumer Funeral Home Choice
Since consumers may not contract directly with crematories, each cremation consumer selects a funeral home.35 I
assume that the disposition decision (cremation versus burial) is made prior to the funeral home choice. In selecting
a funeral home, consumers face a tradeoﬀ between the cost of using a particular funeral home and perceived funeral
home quality. Costs incurred by consumers include the retail price paid, the cost of transporting mourners to services,
and search costs. Since these costs are determined by proximity, funeral homes may derive much market power from
horizontal diﬀerentiation by geographic location.
Consumer i’s valuation of funeral home h is given by
Vi,h = δh − βidist(i,h) + i,h (1)
where
δh = x0
hΘ − αph + ξh (2)
In these equations, xh is the vector of funeral home attributes described in the previous section, ph is the retail price
of cremation services, and dist(i,h) is the distance from the decedent’s residence to funeral home h. Extensive pricing
dispersion (see Figure 6) suggests that unobserved quality is potentially important in guiding consumer choice. To
address this concern, I include two additional terms which proxy for unobserved quality. Funeral home attributes
observed by the consumer but unobserved in the data are captured by ξh. I also allow quality measures unobserved
consumers.
34Subsequent estimation accounts for the multi-establishment case.
35I will use the term “consumer” to denote the individual making the funeral home choice. For the purpose of this model, it does not
matter whether the consumer is the deceased individual or his agent. There is no outside good in this model. Although some consumers
belong to cremation societies sponsored by integrated funeral homes, these are essentially a marketing device. Since an establishment is
considered to be an address, funeral home demand includes cremation-society related demand.
12in the data, but known to consumers, to inﬂuence funeral home choice idiosyncratically through i,h.36
Each consumer selects the funeral home for which he has the highest valuation. If consumer i selects funeral
home h∗, utility maximization implies
Vi,h∗ ≥ Vi,h,∀h
4.1.2 Unintegrated Firm Retail Pricing Choice
Unintegrated funeral homes account for the cost of providing cremation services when selecting retail prices. In
setting prices, I assume that funeral homes do not consider any impact their pricing decision may have on wholesale
pricing by crematories. Let p be the vector of retail prices, and let r index crematories. Unintegrated funeral home
u chooses retail price pu to maximize proﬁts
πu = [pu − costu,r]qu(p) − Γu (3)
where costu,r is given by
costu,r = feer + γ dist(u,r) + retcostu + δ integr + κcompetitoru,r + ξr − u,r (4)
In the above equations, cremation demand for funeral home u (in bodies) is given by qu, and ﬁxed costs of operation
for the funeral home are denoted by Γu. The marginal cost of providing cremation services, costu,r, consists of several
elements. In addition to the wholesale price paid to the crematory, feer, the funeral home must incur transportation
costs, γ dist(u,r). Costs associated with providing retail cremation services that are borne by the funeral home, such
as removal and professional services, are captured by retcostu.
The cost structure accounts for potential foreclosure in the wholesale market relating to retail market compe-
tition. The indicator terms integr and competitoru,r allow the marginal cost of using a particular crematory to
vary depending on whether the crematory belongs to an integrated ﬁrm and if the crematory’s ﬁrm is a direct retail
market competitor to funeral home u respectively. I cannot separately identify whether the absence of a relationship
is the choice of the crematory or the unintegrated funeral home. The coeﬃcient on competitoru,r could represent
quality degradation for rival subcontractors, denial of service, or price discrimination by integrated crematories.37 It
is also possible that it represents psychic costs incurred by unintegrated funeral homes when subcontracting with a
retail rival. Regardless of the exact interpretation of the term, its economic function is to raise rivals’ costs.
I include two terms that inﬂuence crematory choice which are unobserved in the data. Time-invariant provider
quality, such as a reputation for reliable or timely service, is captured by the inclusion of a crematory ﬁxed-eﬀect, ξr,
36One example of idiosyncratic preference is familiarity with a particular funeral director through participation in a civic organization.
37Although I am told that the crematory fee charged is the same for all potential subcontractors, I cannot exclude this possibility.
13and is assumed to impact marginal costs. I also allow the cost of using a particular crematory to vary idiosyncratically
across funeral homes through u,r. This cost shock is known by funeral home u and crematory r but is not observed
by other crematories or in the data.38
For a single-establishment ﬁrm, optimal pricing is given by the Lerner equation.
4.1.3 Integrated Firm Retail Pricing Choice
Integrated ﬁrms earn revenues both by providing services directly to consumers in the retail market and by cremating
bodies for other funeral homes in the wholesale market. The set of potential wholesale subcontractors consists of all
unintegrated funeral homes. Since the integrated ﬁrm does not observe u,r for other crematories with which funeral
home u could contract, demand for wholesale cremation services is uncertain. Therefore, integrated ﬁrms’ proﬁts are
a function of expected, as opposed to actual, wholesale demand.
Let e and ec index integrated ﬁrm funeral homes and crematories respectively. Expected proﬁts for an integrated
ﬁrm fint are given by the sum of proﬁts from retail and wholesale cremation operations
E[πint
f ] = [pe − crcostec − γdist(e,ec) − retcoste]qe(p) − Γe
+ [feeec − crcostec]
X
u∈U
Pr(choiceu,ec)qu(p) − Γec (5)
where crcostec is the internal cost to the crematory of cremating one body and Γec are ﬁxed costs associated with
wholesale cremation operations. The remaining variables are deﬁned as in the unintegrated case. Note that dist(e,ec),
the distance from the integrated funeral home to the crematory, is zero when the crematory is co-located with the
funeral home.




= qe + [pe − crcostec − γdist(e,ec) − retcoste]
∂qe
∂pe







The ﬁrst two terms are identical to the unintegrated ﬁrm pricing optimality condition. The third term reﬂects the
38In my model, u,r enters in negatively for computational simplicity. In subsequent estimation, I will assume that it follows the Type
1 extreme-value distribution. Since this distribution is asymmetric, the sign matters in determining choice probabilities. See Anderson
and de Palma (1999) for a discussion of reverse discrete choice models.
14fact that retail pricing by an integrated ﬁrm aﬀects retail demand for competitor funeral homes, and thus, potential
proﬁts from subcontracting.
Retail markups for integrated ﬁrms are given by
pe − crcostec − γdist(e,ec) − retcoste = −









Due to the impact of retail pricing on wholesale proﬁts, the retail markup expression for integrated ﬁrms diﬀers from
the standard Lerner equation.
4.2 Wholesale Market
As participants in the retail cremation market, unintegrated funeral homes must select a facility to perform cremation
since they do not have access to equipment within the ﬁrm. Observing the prices at which crematories oﬀer wholesale
services, each unintegrated funeral home selects the cost-minimizing provider. On the supply side, I assume that
each crematory selects one price that is charged to all subcontracting funeral homes.
4.2.1 Unintegrated Funeral Home Wholesale Provider Choice
Each unintegrated funeral home selects either an independent crematory or an integrated ﬁrm to provide wholesale
cremation services. Let R be the set of cremation providers. Since integrated ﬁrms located nearby are retail market
competitors, there is tension between minimizing travel costs and strategic considerations. Given retail demand, qu,
retail pricing, pu, and crematory fees, feer ∀r ∈ R, funeral home u selects provider r∗ if
costu,r∗ < costu,r,∀r (8)
where costu,r is given by (4). Conceptually, the funeral director is free to change suppliers with each new body. Once
in possession of a body, he examines a list of posted crematory fees and chooses the supplier that minimizes costs.
4.2.2 Cremation Provider Fee Choice
Each crematory chooses a wholesale price, feer, to maximize expected proﬁts from providing cremation services.
For independent crematory c, expected proﬁts from providing wholesale cremation services are given by
E[πc] = [feec − crcostc]
X
u∈U
Pr(choiceu,c)qu(p) − Γc (9)
where qu is the number of bodies provided by unintegrated funeral home u, Pr(choiceu,c) is the probability that
15funeral home u selects crematory c, Γc represents ﬁxed costs of operating a crematory, and crcostc reﬂects the
internal cost to the crematory of providing cremation services. Elements of crcostc include labor costs, equipment
maintenance, and fuel costs.
Assuming price competition in the wholesale cremation services market, the implied markups are
















The second term in the denominator is the wholesale demand impact resulting from retail pricing responses by
unintegrated funeral homes to crematory fee changes.
Unlike their independent counterparts, integrated ﬁrms’ willingness to provide cremation services may be inﬂu-
enced by retail market competition. I assume that integrated ﬁrms consider retail pricing responses by unintegrated
funeral homes to wholesale fee choices but not potential retail pricing responses by other integrated ﬁrms. From
integrated ﬁrm proﬁts (5), pricing optimality in the wholesale market yields the following expression for integrated
crematory markups
feeec − crcostec =






















Let the denominator of (11) be Φ(·). Combining (11) with the retail market optimality condition (7) yields the
following expression for integrated ﬁrm wholesale markups

































0, higher wholesale cremation prices lead to higher retail prices for unintegrated funeral homes. In turn, this increases
retail demand for the integrated ﬁrm, and decreases wholesale demand for its services.
For simplicity in estimation, I assume that crematories only consider the impact on the probability that they are
selected by unintegrated funeral homes when choosing wholesale prices. That is, I assume that crematories do not
consider retail pricing responses by unintegrated ﬁrms.39 Since I only observe retail prices in cross-section, identifying







= 0. The restrictiveness of this assumption will be evaluated in a later version.
16this should not have a ﬁrst-order impact for reasonable values of
∂pu
∂feer
. With this assumption, both independent
and integrated crematory markups may be expressed











If an integrated crematory is geographically isolated, denial of service to nearby funeral homes could substantially
raise rivals’ costs of doing business. Although the presence of an independent crematory in the market potentially
prevents this from occurring, independent crematories are able to charge a higher price than they could in the absence
of foreclosure by integrated ﬁrms. The extent to which independent crematories capitalize on this potential source
of market power is an empirical question that will be explored in the sections that follow.
5 Estimation
In this section, I estimate two discrete choice demand models motivated by the theoretical model. In the retail
market, I estimate demand for funeral homes by cremation consumers. Estimates indicate that proximity is the
primary driver of consumer funeral home choice. It follows that distance is a valid metric for measuring the degree
of competition among funeral homes in the retail market. In the wholesale market, I estimate a model of crematory
choice by unintegrated funeral homes. I ﬁnd that unintegrated funeral homes are signiﬁcantly less likely to contract
with retail market competitors. Wholesale markups implied by the estimates are roughly 80 percent of the wholesale
price and are higher for independent crematories. In the retail market, both unintegrated and integrated funeral
homes wield substantial market power with median markups of 67 and 79 percent of the retail price respectively.
5.1 Retail Market Demand: Consumer Funeral Home Choice
I use detailed micro-data from death certiﬁcates to estimate the model of consumer funeral home choice described
above. Variation in the choice sets available to each consumer allows the coeﬃcients to be identiﬁed. For the purpose
of estimation, I assume that i,h is distributed Type I extreme-value and that E[ξh] = 0. I let βi = z0
iζ, permitting
the distance between the decedent’s residence and the funeral home to inﬂuence consumer funeral home valuations
in a manner that is correlated with observed decedent demographics, zi.40 Consequently, the restrictions imposed
by the independence of irrelevant alternatives implied by the logit model only apply in cases where decedents live
within the same zip code and share all elements of the consumer demographic vector.
Since pricing is potentially correlated with unobserved funeral home quality, I instrument for retail price by
40Tay (2003) also incorporates detailed consumer demographic and location data in a spatial demand model. Thomadsen (2005) and
Davis (2006) use consumer demographic information, albeit at a more aggregate level.
17exploiting variation in the cost to the funeral home of providing cremation services. Because the funeral home is
responsible for transporting bodies to the crematory, the distance to the principal cremation supplier is a cost-shifter.
As shown in Table 9, the distance from the funeral home to the cremation supplier is signiﬁcant in explaining retail
cremation prices, but not burial prices. Therefore, this cost-based instrument appears to be a valid source of variation
for purging the regression of unobserved price and funeral home quality correlates.
Coeﬃcient estimates were obtained in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, distance and demographic interactions as
well as funeral home ﬁxed eﬀects were included as regressors, and choice probabilities were estimated using maximum
likelihood.41 In the second stage, estimated ﬁxed eﬀects, b δh, from the ﬁrst stage were projected onto the vector of
funeral home descriptors, including price. Prices were instrumented for using two-stage least squares. Although there
is some loss of eﬃciency in employing this two-stage procedure, it is small relative to the gain in computational ease







pf is the retail price for ﬁrm f and h 6∈ f. The derivations are given in the Appendix.
Estimated coeﬃcients from the ﬁrst stage regression are presented in Table 12. With respect to search propen-
sity, the trends that are signiﬁcant among the distance and consumer demographic interactions are consistent with
intuition. Decedents residing within city limits are more averse to search (on a per mile basis) than those living
outside of city limits. In general, more highly educated individuals are less averse to search, although the relationship
is not monotonic. When spouses are non-existent or dead, the consumer is more apt to travel than if the spouse is
living. This is not surprising since, in these cases, the decedent residence is not a good proxy for the location of the
decision-maker. Those dying in hospices or nursing homes are less averse to search; presumably in these cases there
has been more time for pre-planning.
Coeﬃcients from the second stage regression are reported in Table 13. The signs of estimated funeral home
attribute coeﬃcients are generally consistent with expectations regarding cremation consumer behavior. Funeral
homes that market to adherents of faiths which are not inclined to choose cremation are less likely to be selected by
cremation consumers (negative coeﬃcients on both Hispanic and Jewish marketing). Individuals seeking cremation
are also less likely to select minority-preferred funeral homes, which is consistent with the ﬁnding that minorities are
less disposed to choose cremation (see Table A1). Relative to funeral homes that required two or more phone calls to
elicit pricing information, funeral homes that exhibited greater pricing transparency were more likely to be selected.
Surprisingly, cremation in the funeral home name has a negative sign, controlling for other observed funeral home
attributes.
The estimated coeﬃcient on distance is quite large relative to the price coeﬃcient. The implied search cost is














18$188 per mile for a consumer who is a member of the omitted group. This is roughly equivalent to saving $260 from
search for the median cremation consumer.42 It is possible that substantial search costs or transportation costs for
all attending the funeral drive the large coeﬃcient on distance. The implied demand elasticities have mean -2.360
and median -1.508 across funeral homes.43
5.2 Wholesale Market Demand: Cremation Provider Choice
I next estimate a model of crematory choice by unintegrated funeral homes. As discussed above, each unintegrated
funeral home selects the lowest marginal cost supplier. I permit choices to change on a quarterly basis. For the
purpose of estimation, I assume that u,r,t is distributed Type 1 extreme-value. Since wholesale prices are unobserved,
I include a scaling parameter, σ, to ﬂexibly estimate the price level. With these additions, unintegrated funeral home
marginal costs (4) may be rewritten




The unobserved component of marginal cost includes not only econometric error but also the wholesale price and
other unobserved provider-speciﬁc attributes, ξr.44 I estimate two speciﬁcations, including ﬁxed-eﬀects to proxy for
provider-speciﬁc marginal cost components, −σ(ξr + δ integr + feer,t). In one speciﬁcation, I assume the wholesale
price is constant over time and include provider ﬁxed eﬀects, while in the other I allow the price to change and
include crematory*quarter ﬁxed eﬀects.45 Funeral home-speciﬁc descriptors do not impact the estimates since cost
diﬀerences across crematories identify the model.46
I estimate a conditional logit model of crematory choice by unintegrated funeral homes. The choice set consists
of all independent crematories and non-exclusive, integrated crematories located in Minnesota and operating during
that quarter. Estimates can be found in Table 14. Controlling for distance to the crematory and unobserved
crematory-speciﬁc attributes, unintegrated funeral homes are 0.42 times as likely, on average, to select a crematory
that is owned by a retail market competitor as they are to select non-competitor crematories. The coeﬃcient on
competitoru,r,t is marginally signiﬁcant but robust across speciﬁcations. This decreased propensity to contract with
42From Table 3, the median distance to the nearest funeral home for a cremation consumer is one mile and the median distance to the
second nearest funeral home is 2.39 miles, so 1.4 ∗ 188 = 260. This value is between the average cremation discount that funeral homes
posting prices or responding to internet inquiries oﬀer ($314 and $168 respectively from Table 9).
43These were computed using the expression for
∂E[qh]
∂ph derived in the Appendix and actual qh and ph values.
44Unobserved cost to the funeral home of providing retail cremation services, retcostu,t, will not be estimated directly.
45Although integr is observed, it is not separately identiﬁed from unobserved correlates. I do not have an instrument for integration
status. Additionally, I cannot include both provider and provider*quarter ﬁxed eﬀects in the same estimation since there is no variation
to identify the provider ﬁxed eﬀects.








exp(−σ (ξr + feer,t + δintegr) − σγdist(u,r) − σκcompetitoru,r,t)
19retail market competitors is equivalent to approximately eleven miles in transportation costs on average.
In the above speciﬁcations, I restricted the impact of retail market competition on crematory choice to be the
same regardless of local wholesale market structure. If the coeﬃcient on competitoru,r,t represents foreclosure by
integrated crematories, the ability of integrated ﬁrms to inﬂict higher costs upon retail rivals should vary with the
number of wholesale contracting options available to unintegrated funeral homes. That is, the estimated coeﬃcient
on competitoru,r,t should have the greatest magnitude in markets with few crematories. Table 15 reports the results
of an alternative speciﬁcation in which the coeﬃcient on competitoru,r,t is allowed to vary based on the number
of crematories located within 25 miles of funeral home u. The absolute magnitude of the coeﬃcient is decreasing
in the number of crematories located near the funeral home, suggesting that costs associated with using a retail
market competitor are decreasing in the intensity of wholesale competition. This general pattern is consistent with
foreclosure by integrated crematories.47
Since I cannot separately identify the impact of integration status from other provider-speciﬁc marginal cost
determinants, I examine the impact of organizational form on relationship propensity in Figure 8.48 In the ﬁgure,
estimated choice probabilities from the baseline speciﬁcation are plotted against actual distance between the fu-
neral home and potential cremation provider. Surfaces are obtained using local mean smoothing. Three surfaces
are displayed, corresponding to the three crematory classiﬁcations from the above model: integrated ﬁrm owning
competitor funeral home (integr = 1 and competitoru,r,t = 1), integrated ﬁrm not owning competitor funeral home
(integr = 1 and competitoru,r,t = 0), and independent crematory (integr = 0 and competitoru,r,t = 0).
At close distances, integrated competitors are about 35 percent less likely (in absolute terms) to be selected on
average than independent crematories, with the diﬀerence converging and eventually disappearing at 29 miles. Recall
that competitoru,r,t relates to the relative location of retail market participants; that is, it does not relate to the
relative location of funeral home u and provider r per se, but rather the unintegrated funeral home and all funeral
homes belonging to the same ﬁrm as the crematory. Although most integrated crematories are co-located with funeral
homes, four crematories are not located on-site of a funeral home. Therefore, it is possible, but not common, for an
unintegrated funeral home to be located within ﬁve miles of the crematory but not consider the crematory ﬁrm to
be a competitor (competitoru,r,t = 0). Although these funeral homes are likely to select the proximate crematory,
interpretation should be informed by the caveat that this represents relatively few potential contracting relationships
and is not generally representative.
47I also estimated a speciﬁcation enabling transportation costs to vary with the number of crematories located nearby. Results were
similar to the speciﬁcation reported.
48Although the model was estimated allowing the funeral home to choose any (non-exclusive dealing) crematory in the state, the plot
shows predicted probabilities up to a distance of 50 miles. This cutoﬀ lies between the 75th percentile (41 miles) and the 90th percentile
(65.6 miles) of actual selected provider distances.
205.3 Wholesale Markup Determination
From the above model, estimated crematory markups may be expressed49













Since both wholesale prices and the scaling parameter, σ, are unknown, a dollar normalization may not be obtained
directly from the estimates. Therefore, I obtain the normalization basis indirectly. According to industry sources,
the marginal cost to a crematory of processing a body is approximately $50.50 The wholesale price of an independent
crematory as of March 2007 was identiﬁed on a funeral home price list. Assuming this wholesale price applied to
the third quarter of 2006, I calculate the wholesale markup for this crematory assuming that the marginal cost to
this crematory of processing a body, crcostr, is $50. From the markup, estimated choice probabilities, and actual
quantities, I obtain b σ for diﬀerent speciﬁcations. Imputed b σ is 0.0078 in the provider ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation and
0.0083 in the provider*quarter speciﬁcation. Implied transportation costs are around $10 per mile. Although the
magnitude of the estimated (per mile) transportation cost is quite high, it is relatively robust across speciﬁcations.
Using the values of the scaling parameter obtained above, I compute wholesale markups from (15). Summary
statistics for estimated markups are given in Table 16. Although some markups are extremely large, this is to be
expected since, within the context of the model, the absence of a vertical relationship is not separately identiﬁed
from a high implied value for feer,t. To address this consideration, I also calculate wholesale markup means and
medians, conditional on excluding the largest 10 percent.51 Median markups for all crematories range from $148 to
$170, with means varying from $181 to $200. Adding $50 to these markups yields values for wholesale prices within
the reasonable range.
The magnitude of estimated wholesale markups follows organizational form, with independent crematories enjoy-
ing larger markups. Within the set of integrated crematories, those that predominantly cremate bodies originating at
funeral homes outside of the ﬁrm have larger markups than those that predominately source bodies within the ﬁrm.
Note that these relative comparisons are independent of the value of the scaling parameter. Interpretation should
be informed by the caveat that the assumption that
∂pu
∂feer
= 0 may diﬀerentially depress integrated crematory
markups.
49Refer to the Appendix for the derivation. In calculating markups, I assume that all cremated bodies are sent to the principal supplier
for that quarter.
50Components of this cost are labor, fuel (cremation retorts are generally gas-ﬁred), and maintenance costs for the retort. Labor for
operating the equipment is unskilled, and no special certiﬁcation is required. It seems unlikely that these costs would vary substantially
across crematories. According to an interview with one crematory owner, maintenance costs average under $1000 annually. These costs
include rebricking the retort after every 1500 cremations (at a cost of $8000), replacing opacity tubes annually, and transporting the
technician to the crematory.
51I do this because very large estimated markups imply high wholesale prices. It is unlikely that unusually high wholesale prices are
actually paid by any funeral homes. Revising the choice set to exclude crematories that had no subcontractors in a prior period and
those which had no output in the period caused a reduction in the range of markups observed.
21One possible interpretation of this ﬁnding is that “distaste” for forming relationships with retail market competi-
tors allows independent crematories to extract higher markups. In order to investigate this possibility, I constrain the
coeﬃcient on competitoru,r,t in the baseline speciﬁcation and the coeﬃcients on the competitoru,r,t interaction terms
in the ﬂexible speciﬁcation to be zero and recalculate implied markups. Wholesale markups with this constraint are
given in Table 17. In the ﬂexible speciﬁcation, about 60 percent of the diﬀerence in markups across organizational
form is attributed to strategic considerations in contracting arising from retail market competition. According to
counterfactual estimates, decreased competition in the wholesale market resulting from these considerations trans-
lates to $37 higher markups on average for independent crematories (using the ﬂexible speciﬁcation) and $2 lower
markups for integrated crematories. Recall that this estimate does not account for general aversion to contracting
with retail market competitors located more than ﬁve miles away.
5.4 Retail Markup Determination
Given b σ inferred above, retail marginal cost elements may be obtained from model estimates. For ﬁrms not pricing
at the ﬁrm level, I take the cremation price to be the average across funeral homes belonging to the ﬁrm.52 Two
marginal cost elements from (14) remain uncalculated for unintegrated funeral homes. The sum of wholesale price
and unobserved quality, feer,t + ξr, can be derived from estimated ﬁxed eﬀects, and the marginal cost of retail
operations may be found using model optimality conditions (see Appendix). In this calculation, I assume that the
retail price elasticities implied by the estimated funeral home choice probabilities do not change during the entire
period under examination. Furthermore, I assume that the marginal cost of providing retail services, retcost, is
identical for all funeral homes belonging to the same ﬁrm.
There is no reason to believe that average per mile transportation costs or the marginal cost of providing retail
services would diﬀer drastically across funeral home integration status.53 In calculating retail markups for integrated
funeral homes, transportation costs are calculated using the estimated per mile basis obtained from the crematory
choice model, retcost is assumed to be equal to the median estimated value for unintegrated ﬁrms, $180.25, and the
marginal cost of cremating a body, crcost, is assumed to be $50.
Estimated retail markups for the third quarter of 2006 are shown in Table 18.54 Retail markups are considerable
at 67 percent for unintegrated funeral homes and 79 percent for integrated funeral homes. Although markups appear
high, I did not estimate ﬁxed costs, so I cannot evaluate overall funeral home proﬁtability.55 Integrated funeral homes
are able to earn larger markups by both avoiding double-marginalization in the wholesale market and decreasing
52Of the 11 multi-brand ﬁrms, seven are unintegrated and four are integrated.
53Components of the cost of providing retail cremation services include removal of the body from the place of death, preparation for
the cremation process, and ﬁling death certiﬁcates. If anything, lower-cost ﬁrms have a greater incentive to integrate. See Hart and
Tirole (1990).
54I report markups for the third quarter of 2006 since potential pricing and ownership mismeasurement would not bias those estimates.
Recall that I only observe prices as of Spring 2007 and ﬁrm ownership as of the third quarter of 2006.
55Fixed costs could be estimated by explicitly modeling entry. However, that is beyond the scope of this paper.
22transportation costs. The median estimated marginal cost value for unintegrated funeral homes ($670) is below the
lowest observed retail price of cremation ($850). Since few unintegrated funeral homes use competitors for wholesale
cremation services, the median value of the competitor aversion coeﬃcient is zero.
Retail market competition inﬂuences the costs incurred by unintegrated funeral homes through two pathways.
Unintegrated funeral homes presumably incur higher transportation costs when they are unable or unwilling to
contract with horizontal competitors. As discussed above, wholesale prices charged by crematories are also aﬀected
by demand distortions owing to strategic considerations in vertical contracting. Table 19 reports the diﬀerences in
costs incurred by unintegrated funeral homes and retail prices paid by consumers due to strategic considerations.
In the aggregate, the impact of retail market competition on costs and pricing is quite modest; marginal costs are
raised by $10 on average, with the transportation cost impact accounting for $5 of the diﬀerence.
Although these magnitudes are small, the aggregate cost and price eﬀects mask substantial heterogeneity across
funeral homes. The results reported in Table 15 suggest that the impact of retail market competition on wholesale
contracting varies with local market structure. The potential for integrated ﬁrms to raise rivals’ costs is greatest
when unintegrated funeral homes have relatively few crematories located nearby. If an unintegrated funeral home
has one proximate crematory that is owned by a competitor, the additional cost faced by the funeral home due to
foreclosure is higher than it would be if the funeral home had a second local crematory.
In Table 19, I separately report results for those funeral homes located near crematories owned by retail market
competitors. A funeral home is considered to face a wholesale monopoly market if there is one crematory located
within 25 miles of the funeral home, and the crematory is owned by a retail market competitor. A funeral home faces
a local duopoly market if there are two crematories located within 25 miles of the funeral home, at least one of which
is owned by a competitor. Consistent with intuition, the transportation cost eﬀect is greater for funeral homes facing
a wholesale monopoly market than those funeral homes facing a wholesale duopoly. Roughly half of the increase in
costs incurred by funeral homes as a result of strategic considerations in vertical contracting are transmitted to retail
consumers, accounting for a four percent ($94 monopoly or $79 duopoly) increase in retail prices. The magnitude
appears small, but it only accounts for impediments to vertical contracting with direct retail market competitors. It
does not account for general inability or unwillingness to contract with integrated crematories.
5.5 Analysis With Limited Wholesale Price Data
The above analysis assumed that wholesale prices were unknown. Although I do not observe wholesale prices charged
by crematories to funeral homes, some funeral homes note a crematory fee on the price lists that they provide to
consumers. In this section, I re-estimate the crematory choice model using this limited wholesale price data. Results
indicate that the impact of retail market competition on wholesale contracting patterns may be understated in the
foregoing investigation.
23I indirectly obtain wholesale prices by linking reported crematory fees from funeral home price lists with the
crematories used. Only a subset of funeral homes report the wholesale price, but the fact that crematories are fewer
in number than funeral homes allows most prices to be ascertained. Since funeral homes only explicitly identify
the crematory used in a few cases, I assume that the wholesale price reported on the price list corresponds to the
principal cremation supplier as of September 2006. When multiple wholesale prices are associated with the same
crematory, I take the lowest reported fee across all funeral homes using the crematory.56 Using this procedure, I
obtain a wholesale price for 38 (of 43 non-exclusive) crematories, 31 integrated and seven independent.
Assuming that these are the actual wholesale prices charged by the crematories, I re-estimate the crematory choice
model. I restrict estimation to those funeral homes selecting crematories for which a wholesale price may be imputed.
The choice set consists of all non-exclusive Minnesota crematories with known wholesale prices. Absent an instrument
for wholesale price, I cannot separately identify unobserved crematory quality, so no ﬁxed eﬀects are included in this
speciﬁcation. I include a dummy for crematory integration status, which is observed (integr = 1 if integrated). Since
wholesale prices were inferred from Spring 2007 price lists, I separately estimate the crematory choice model using
data from the most recent quarter in which choices are observed, the third quarter of 2006. Results are reported in
Table 20. All regressors except for wholesale price are signiﬁcant. Coeﬃcients on both crematory integration status
and the retail market competitor indicators are signiﬁcant and negative, with the coeﬃcient on competitoru,r,t having
about twice the magnitude of the integr coeﬃcient. Thus, using ﬁxed eﬀects to proxy for unobserved wholesale prices
might underestimate the true impact of retail market competition on wholesale subcontracting.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I examined the relationship between retail market competition and wholesale contracting. Using
detailed data from the Minnesota funeral industry, I found that funeral homes seeking wholesale cremation services
were signiﬁcantly less likely to subcontract with crematories belonging to competing ﬁrms. Denial of service, quality
degradation, or unobserved price discrimination by integrated crematories are all potential explanations for the lower
frequency of vertical contracting with retail market competitors. It is also possible that unintegrated funeral homes,
cognizant of large wholesale margins, choose not to raise rivals’ proﬁts by using crematories owned by competitors.
Although it is diﬃcult to determine the precise cause for this lack of contracting, estimates indicate that retail market
competition is a larger impediment to vertical contracting in markets with few crematories.
The presence of strategic considerations in vertical contracting aﬀects prices and allocations in both the wholesale
and retail markets. In the wholesale market, independent crematories enjoy larger markups than they would other-
56Reasons for this discrepancy are manifold. First, funeral homes revise their price lists at diﬀerent times, so variation in prices could
reﬂect diﬀerent historical fees. Second, my assumption that the principal cremation supplier used in September 2006 is the supplier as of
Spring 2007 could be invalid. Third, it appears that some funeral homes include items other than the actual wholesale price paid to the
crematory in the stated “crematory fee.” Fourth, observed fee diﬀerences could be wholesale price discrimination, although I am told
that this generally does not occur.
24wise. In the retail market, funeral homes located near crematories owned by competitors incur higher transportation
costs, a portion of which are passed on to consumers. Although the average impact on retail prices is modest, there
is substantial variation in the price response across funeral homes.
These ﬁndings illustrate one means by which strategic considerations arising from retail market competition
may distort prices and allocations. Throughout this paper, ﬁrm integration status was taken as given. However,
it is also likely that integration into the wholesale market is aﬀected by retail market competition. The fact that
crematories are often located in pairs is suggestive of bandwagoning in equipment acquisition. That is, integration
by a competitor might motivate a funeral home to purchase equipment as well. In future work, I plan to explicitly
model the integration decision, accounting for the role of retail market competition.
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= −αPr(choiceh∗,i)[1 − Pr(choiceh∗,i)]




from estimated consumer choice probabilities



















7.1.3 Wholesale Markup Derivation
It follows from (13) that























= −σPr(choiceu,r∗,t)[1 − Pr(choiceu,r∗,t)]
277.1.4 Derivation of Retail Marginal Cost Elements
Wholesale Prices: Absent a normalization basis, estimates from the logit model identify relative cost diﬀerences
and but not absolute cost levels. That is, it is possible to identify c ∆ηr,t where ∆ηr,t = −σ(ξr + feer,t − ξ0 − fee0).
With a normalization basis, however, the absolute level of −ξr − feer,t may be determined if the wholesale price
is the only crematory attribute that varies with time. If the wholesale price charged by provider a in quarter t∗,
feea,t∗, is observed and unobserved attributes for this crematory are normalized to zero (ξa = 0), the entire series of
wholesale prices plus unobserved quality may be constructed. This follows from
c ∆ηr,t − c ∆ηa,t∗ = −σ[ξr + feer,t − ξ0 − fee0] + σ[feea,t∗ − ξ0 − fee0]
= −σ[ξr + feer,t − feea,t∗]
Therefore
−ξr − feer,t =
c ∆ηr,t − c ∆ηa,t∗
b σ
− feea,t∗
Retail Funeral Home Operations: Let funint index unintegrated ﬁrms. Assume that the marginal cost of oﬀering
retail cremation services is identical for all funeral homes within a ﬁrm (retcostu,t = retcostfunint,t, ∀u ∈ funint).
From unintegrated ﬁrm retail pricing optimality, it follows that
retcostfunint,t = pfunint −
X
u∈funint











I use values of \ [costu,r,t − retcostu,t] from the provider*quarter ﬁxed eﬀect, entire choice set speciﬁcation in calculating
markups.
287.2 Data Appendix
This Appendix details the procedures that I employed in processing the data used in this paper.
7.2.1 Death Certiﬁcate Processing
Analysis was restricted to decedents residing in Minnesota at the time of death and selecting a funeral home located
in Minnesota.57 Bequests were dropped from analysis (N=862). Although the original ﬁle contained some decedent
information from October 2006 (the ﬁle was created mid-October), these observations were dropped (and a quarterly
as opposed to monthly convention adopted) since information for October 2006 was incomplete.
The Geolytics Census 2000 Version 2 (Long Form) CD was used to obtain coordinates for the zip centroid
corresponding the the residence zip code reported on the death certiﬁcate. For non-matching observations, zip codes
were identiﬁed (and corrected when clearly errant) using the United States’ Postal Service website.58 Zip centroid
matches were obtained for 98.2 percent of all death records and for 99.41 percent of cremated decedents.
7.2.2 Crematory Identiﬁcation
In the death certiﬁcate ﬁle, funeral home establishments were recorded by license number while crematories were
identiﬁed as strings. Strings listed on the death certiﬁcate were compared to names on a list of licensed crematories
located in Minnesota that was obtained from the Mortuary Science Section of the Minnesota Department of Health
on July 24, 2006. (A crematory list subsequently obtained on January 11, 2007 was identical.) Occasionally, the
crematory string could not be matched to a crematory on the establishment list (N=2356 or 3.7 percent of cremated
decedents). In a subset of these cases, it is clear from the string itself or from internet searching that the crematory
is located out-of-state.
Occasionally, the exact match was ambiguous in cases where multiple crematories were owned by a ﬁrm. Fifty
crematories are licensed by the State of Minnesota, but 49 are used for analysis.
• Three crematories are owned by the Cremation Society of Minnesota, but it appears that reporting for one
of their crematories generally occurs under another crematory’s license number (or it is not in operation).
According to the death certiﬁcate ﬁle, Metropolitan Crematory processed 10,995 bodies, whereas Twin City
Crematory processed three bodies (despite the fact that Twin City Crematory is co-located with a funeral
home). Their remaining crematory, Twin Ports Crematory, processes 1808 bodies. I ignore the existence of
Twin City Crematory throughout the paper, arriving at a total of 49 crematories.59 Metropolitan Crematory
and Twin City Crematory are separated by 12.8 miles.
• Bodies identiﬁed with the string “Washburn McReavey Crematory” or misspelled variants were all assigned to
the crematory licensed under that name (N =4042). It is unclear, however, if this is necessarily correct since
the Washburn McReavey ﬁrm owns two other crematories - Washburn McReavey Crystal Lake (N=1576) and
Hillside Crematory (N=3375). The distances between Washburn McReavey Crematory and the Crystal Lake
and Hillside locations are 8.75 miles and 11.02 miles respectively.
7.2.3 Funeral Home Descriptors
• Census Tract Attributes: Census tract attributes were obtained from Geolytics Census 2000 Version 2
(Long Form) CD.
• Trade Association Membership: There are two principal trade associations in the funeral industry - the
National Funeral Directors’ Association (NFDA) and Selected Independent Funeral Homes (formerly National
Selected Morticians).60 The NFDA is comprised of several state organizations, the relevant one in this case
being the Minnesota Funeral Directors’ Association (MFDA). Funeral home membership in these organizations
was determined by examining the Associations’ websites in October 2006.61 If one funeral home in the ﬁrm
was listed as a member, it was assumed that all in that ﬁrm were members.
57This resulted in dropping 8009 individuals from the entire decedent universe (burial plus cremation).
58The website is located at http://www.usps.gov.
59I reassign those three bodies to Metropolitan Crematory, but this does not change anything since Twin City Crematory is clearly
not going to be a principal supplier for any funeral home.
60Other notable trade associations include the National Funeral Directors and Morticians Association (NFDMA), comprised of African-
American funeral directors, and the Jewish Funeral Directors of America (JFDA).
61These websites are http://www.mnfuneral.org/ and http://www.selectedfuneralhomes.org/ respectively.
29• Ethnic Marketing: A funeral home was considered to be Jewish if it was a JFDA member, indicated that
it catered speciﬁcally to Jewish clientele in marketing materials, or held a license under a name that indicated
that this was the case (e.g. “Jewish Funeral Services of Minnesota”).
A funeral home was considered to market to Hispanic clientele if it held a license under a name that indicated
that this was the case (e.g.“Funeraria La Paz,” “Funeraria Hispana,” and “Funerarias del Angel”).
• Minority-preferred: A funeral home was considered minority-preferred if at least 50 percent of all decedents
(cremation and burial) utilizing the establishment were minority. There were 12 minority preferred funeral
homes in the dataset.62
• Publicly-traded: A funeral home was considered to be publicly-traded if it was listed on the website of
a publicly-traded funeral ﬁrm on July 19, 2006. Websites consulted included those of Service Corporation
International (SCI), Alderwoods Group (since merged with SCI), Stewart Enterprises, and Carriage Services.
7.2.4 Price Survey Procedure
The price survey was performed in Spring 2007. Initial internet contacts were made in March and ﬁnal phone calls
to non-respondents were made in May. Those not providing information by June were considered non-respondents.
For each funeral home in Minnesota, I searched the internet for a web presence. If information was posted online, I
followed up with an email and/or phone call to conﬁrm that posted price information was current. For those funeral
homes with a web presence but not posting pricing information (the majority of those with websites), I used the
email address provided or online form to request a price list. Although some ﬁrms responded by sending these via
email, most followed up with mailings. Using phone numbers provided by the state, I called those establishments
not responding to my internet inquiry as well as those that did not have websites. I requested that the funeral
home provide a price list via U.S. mail, fax, or email. If information was obtained as a consequence of my initial
contact (including if I left my number with an answering service, but the funeral home returned the call), I coded the
funeral home with the transparency indicator “ﬁrst call.” All funeral homes were contacted a minimum of two times
by telephone. Funeral homes that provided information but required multiple follow-up calls were coded suitably.
Some ﬁrms refused to mail the information but were willing to provide the information over the telephone. In those
instances, the transparency indicator represents the phone call at which that information was made available. Many
multi-establishment ﬁrms utilized the same answering service for all locations. If I was given conﬁrmation that prices
were the same at other ﬁrm locations, I did not contact those other locations directly.
7.2.5 Price Standardization Procedure
Immediate burial prices used in this paper exclude any container. When the quoted price included a container, the
cost of a minimum container (as quoted on the price list) was subtracted. When the cost of the minimum container
was not explicitly noted and the immediate burial price included a container, I subtracted the mean value of the
minimum container implied by all price lists that included the information, $116. This occurred in three instances
(0.97 percent).
Cremation prices used in this paper are the cost of direct cremation, including the crematory fee and excluding
any container. Most of the time, the quoted direct cremation price followed this conﬁguration. When prices reﬂected
a diﬀerent conﬁguration, adjustments were made. With respect to container inclusion, the same adjustment as
performed as with immediate burial. This occurred in 40 instances (9.7 percent). With respect to fees, if the fee was
noted elsewhere on the price list, this was simply added into the cost for direct cremation.63 If the fee was excluded,
I examined whether a “crematory fee” or “cremation fee” was itemized on any other price list of a funeral home
identiﬁed to be using the same principal subcontracting crematory in September 2006. I used the fee listed on those
funeral homes’ price lists in instances in which a match could be obtained. When multiple fees were listed, I used the
lowest fee.64 This occurred in 45 instances (10.9 percent). When no itemized fee was listed on any subcontracting
funeral home’s price list, I took the average of reported fees on the list, $316, and added that to the quoted direct
cremation price. This occurred in eight instances (1.9 percent). Although this treatment is imperfect, I felt that it
was superior to ignoring reporting diﬀerences.
62For reference, the sample is 94.87 percent white.
63I do not use these fees in estimation. In some cases they appear to actually reﬂect the crematory fee, but in other instances they
appear to reﬂect additional costs.
64The lack of matching could have many causes. Funeral homes vary with respect to the interval of time that passes between price list
revisions. It is possible that the fee listed matches that of the old subcontractor or does not represent the current wholesale price.
307.2.6 Firm Deﬁnition
I considered an establishment to be an address, so all bodies corresponding to all license numbers located at that
address were included in the establishment statistics and in the deﬁnition of establishment entry and exit dates.
According to the Mortuary Science Section, a change of ownership, change in name, or change in address does not
generate a new license number. In some cases, the same address was given for multiple license numbers. A cremation
society may have a separate license number even if it is located at the same location.
The establishment ownership ﬁle obtained from the Mortuary Science Section identiﬁes up to three owners
(names as strings). If there was at least one common owner among the (up to) three named owners, establishments
were considered to be part of the same ﬁrm. For publicly traded ﬁrms, websites were consulted on July 19, 2006.
For those establishments for which owners were not identiﬁed in the state data, it was assumed that they were
sole proprietorships unless the price lists indicated that multiple locations belonged to the same ﬁrm (21 funeral
homes representing 17 ﬁrms). This was mostly an issue for establishments which had closed down since ownership
information was current as of 2006. Note that in all cases, the method used to deal with ambiguity implies that ﬁrm
deﬁnitions provide a lower bound on concentration.
Crematory and funeral home establishment addresses were geocoded using Maptitude. For those addresses not
matching, internet searches were conducted to ﬁnd the exact address. Addresses noted on price lists were consulted to
double-check the address information provided by the state. In a few cases, more accurate information was obtained
during the price survey. In these cases, the address noted on the price list was used. Google Maps was used to ﬁnd




Number of Funeral Number of Firms











Total Number of Firms 220
Total Number of Funeral Homes 491
Average Firm Size 2.2
Median Firm Size 1
Over half of ﬁrms operating in the retail market are single-establishment. These ﬁgures were computed using all establishments that
operate at some point during the period under examination. As such, they are an upper bound on ﬁrm size.
32Table 2
Firm Size Distribution by Integration Status
Number of Funeral Number of Integrated Number of Unintegrated











Total Number of Firms 36 184
Total Number of Funeral Homes 157 334
Average Firm Size 4.4 1.8
Median Firm Size 3 1





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Decedent Demographics (zi) Funeral Home Descriptors (xh)
Funeral home attributes
Gender Distance from decedent residence
Age Publicly-traded ﬁrm
Education Minority-preferred funeral home
Race Jewish, Hispanic marketing
Birthplace Trade association membership
Residence in city limits Cremation in establishment name
Marital status Census tract attributes
Military service Population density
Place of death Median household income
Autopsy Median value of owner-occupied housing
Manner of death MSA indicators
Informant relationship Pricing transparency
Prices online
Internet reply
Responded ﬁrst phone call
35Table 5
Decedent Demographic Statistics
Demographic Percent of Demographic Percent of
Descriptor Decedents Descriptor Decedents
Female 50.1 Place of death
Age Residence 29.8
Under 18 1.2 Board and care home 0.2
18-24 0.8 Hospice 2.4
25-40 2.5 Hospital 31.9
41-60 19.0 Nursing home 28.8
61-65 6.6 Supervised living facility 0.1
66-70 7.5 Other 6.8
71-75 10.1 Birthplace
76-80 12.3 Minnesota 64.5
Over 80 40.0 US, non-MN 31.7
Education Outside US 3.4
Less than high school 9.3 Unknown 0.4
Some high school 7.9 Residence in city limits 90.0
High school graduate 41.9 Autopsy
Some college 21.3 Yes 10.6
College graduate 18.1 Unknown 0.2
Unknown 2.1 Manner of death
Race Natural causes 92.7
White, non-Hispanic 95.7 Accident 4.7
Black 1.7 Homicide 0.1
Hispanic 0.8 Suicide 2.3
Asian 1.0 Other, unknown 0.2
Native American 0.7 Informant relationship
Unknown 0.1 Family 96.9
Marital Status Self 0.03
Married 41.6 Military service
Divorced 15.5 Yes 27.9
Never married 12.1 Unknown 0.2
Widowed 30.7
Unknown 0.2
An observation is a cremated decedent from the third quarter of 2006, conditional on being in the estimation sample (N=2969). A
decedent is included in the estimation sample if he used a funeral home within 25 miles (urban) or 35 miles (rural) of his residence.
36Table 6
Funeral Home Summary Statistics
Funeral home attributes Percent of Funeral Homes
Publicly-traded ﬁrm 2.3








Census tract attributes Median Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Median household income 37,672 40,262 12,189 15,965 142,796
Median home value 85,000 93,231 41,415 32,300 397,200
Population density 278 1,551 2751 3 26,154
Pricing transparency Percent of Funeral Homes
Prices online 2.7
Internet reply 21.4
Responded ﬁrst call 53.7
An observation is a funeral home operating at some point during the third quarter of 2006 (N=443). Census tract attributes are statistics




Median Mean Std. Dev Min Max
All Funeral Homes
Burial Price 2220 2253.18 652.60 475 4000
Cremation Price 2109 2173.31 666.69 850 3910
Vertically Integrated Funeral Homes
Burial Price 2550 2474.59 628.82 1125 3635
Cremation Price 2095 2220.50 754.84 965 3665
Unintegrated Funeral Homes
Burial Price 2160 2143.27 637.15 475 4000
Cremation Price 2114.50 2149.88 618.43 850 3910
An observation is a funeral home in operation during the third quarter of 2006. Price information was obtained for 137 vertically
integrated funeral homes and 276 unintegrated funeral homes. Integration status is deﬁned at the ﬁrm level. Prices reported are those
for immediate burial and direct cremation, including the crematory fee and excluding the container. Although burial prices are higher






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Burial Price Cremation Price Cremation/Burial
Price Ratio
Distance from Funeral Home 2.0945 6.6673‡‡ 0.0020†
to Cremation Supplier (1.6750) (1.6921) (0.0008)
Selected Independent -517.27‡‡ -386.58‡‡ 0.1549‡
Funeral Homes Member (117.99) (119.20) (0.0553)
MFDA Member 166.11† 131.69 0.0019
(78.491) (79.295) (0.0363)
Publicly-traded -181.34 -218.50 -0.0816
(220.56) (222.82) (0.1018)
Minority-preferred -67.604 -29.245 0.0059
(337.38) (340.84) (0.1555)
Cremation in Name 295.88‡‡ 79.596 -0.1079‡
(82.947) (83.797) (0.0385)
Jewish Marketing -153.87 270.85 0.2138
(440.37) (444.88) (0.2031)
Hispanic Marketing 689.96 25.382 -0.2869
(421.57) (425.89) (0.1946)
Price Online -718.58‡‡ -314.25 0.2805‡
(217.64) (219.87) (0.1006)
Respond to Internet Inquiry -392.05‡‡ -167.50 0.1574‡
(107.72) (108.82) (0.0500)
Respond First Call -173.32 40.680 0.1057†
(95.661) (96.642) (0.0441)
Median HH Income -9.6896 -9.2449 0.0012
($1000s) (4.9933) (5.0445) (0.0023)
Median Home Value 2.9113 2.0203 -0.0006
($1000s) (1.5740) (1.5901) (0.0007)
Population Density -0.0375† -0.0514‡ -0.0000
(living people/square mile) (0.0162) (0.0164) (7.47e-06)
Firm Vertically Integrated -0.1686‡‡
(0.0336)
Model Fit
N 320 320 320
F 5.59 7.33 4.51
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adjusted-R2 0.2234 0.2842 0.1877
An observation is a funeral home. The dependent variable in each regression is given by the column header. The distance to the the
cremation supplier is signiﬁcant in explaining variation in the cremation price but not the burial price. Integrated ﬁrms charge less
for cremation relative to burial than unintegrated ﬁrms. All regressions include a constant and also include MSA ﬁxed eﬀects. ‡‡ =

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Wholesale Supplier Choice Summary Statistics
Median Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Distance to Cremation Provider, dist(u,r) 110.40 116.48 67.888 0.127 411.54
Cremation Provider Owns
Competitor Funeral Home, competitoru,r,t 0 0.0216 0.145 0 1
An observation is a crematory*funeral home*quarter (N= 177,850). All quarters are used.
41Table 12: Consumer Funeral Home Demand: First Stage Results
Coeﬃcient Std. Error P-value Odds Ratio
Distance from residence -0.32017 0.04380 0.000 0.726
Residence within city limits -0.04240 0.01685 0.006 0.958
Female -0.01912 0.01366 0.081 0.981
Age (omitted: 71-75)
Under 18 0.06919 0.05600 0.108 1.072
18-24 -0.07169 0.06664 0.141 0.931
25-40 0.04904 0.03610 0.087 1.050
41-60 0.00592 0.02167 0.392 1.006
61-65 -0.02048 0.02741 0.227 0.980
66-70 0.00040 0.02483 0.494 1.000
76-80 0.02787 0.02227 0.105 1.028
Over 80 0.03725 0.01924 0.026 1.038
Race (omitted: White, non-Hispanic)
Black 0.03080 0.04483 0.246 1.031
Hispanic 0.05815 0.05620 0.150 1.060
Asian -0.13470 0.07916 0.044 0.874
Native American -0.16886 0.09135 0.032 0.845
Education (omitted: Less than high school)
Some high school 0.00544 0.02473 0.413 1.005
High school grad 0.03730 0.01887 0.024 1.038
Some college 0.02814 0.02071 0.087 1.029
College grad 0.04757 0.02157 0.014 1.049
Marital Status (omitted: Married)
Divorced 0.03118 0.01605 0.026 1.032
Never married 0.07003 0.01921 0.000 1.073
Widowed 0.05083 0.01390 0.000 1.052
Unknown -0.04365 0.15834 0.391 0.957
Military service
Yes -0.02770 0.01527 0.035 0.973
Unknown -0.06632 0.14130 0.319 0.936
Place of death (omitted: Residence)
Board and care home -0.08301 0.12812 0.259 0.920
Hospital -0.04196 0.01390 0.001 0.959
Hospice 0.04664 0.03556 0.095 1.048
Nursing home 0.01919 0.01393 0.084 1.019
Supervised living facility -0.78606 0.42240 0.031 0.456
Other 0.01787 0.01987 0.184 1.018
Autopsy
Yes -0.02029 0.02026 0.158 0.980
Unknown 0.07701 0.06486 0.118 1.080
Manner of death (omitted: Natural causes)
Accident 0.03790 0.02555 0.069 1.039
Homicide -0.08735 0.20176 0.333 0.916
Suicide 0.01745 0.03574 0.313 1.018
Other, unknown -0.07606 0.15671 0.314 0.927
Birthplace (omitted: MN)
US, non-MN -0.00814 0.01120 0.234 0.992
Outside US -0.00568 0.03245 0.431 0.994
Unknown -0.06711 0.11962 0.287 0.935
Informant Relationship
family member -0.01286 0.03146 0.341 0.987
self -12.2635 952.616 0.495 0.000
An observation is a decedent*funeral home. The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the funeral home was selected. Reported
coeﬃcients are distance*demographic interactions. Funeral home ﬁxed eﬀects were also included (not reported). All funeral homes in
operation, including those missing price information, were included in this ﬁrst stage. Model Fit Summary: N =179,357 , LR χ2 = 9752.88,
Prob> χ2
479 = 0.000 , Pseudo-R2 (McFadden’s) =0.459 42Table 13
Consumer Funeral Home Demand: Second Stage Results
Coeﬃcient Std. Error P-value Odds Ratio
Cremation price -0.00170 0.00002 0.000 0.998
Funeral home attributes
Cremation in name -0.18320 0.01130 0.000 0.833
Selected Independent -0.65849 0.01612 0.000 0.518
MFDA 0.70833 0.01307 0.000 2.031
Hispanic marketing -0.69004 0.03056 0.000 0.502
Jewish marketing -0.51698 0.03238 0.000 0.596
Minority-preferred -0.81393 0.03014 0.000 0.443
Publicly-traded -0.17786 0.01711 0.000 0.837
Census tract attributes
Median household income ($1000s) -0.00200 0.00043 0.000 0.998
Median home value ($1000s) 0.00632 0.00014 0.000 1.006
Population density 0.00003 0.00000 0.000 1.000
Pricing transparency
Prices online 0.72385 0.02282 0.000 2.062
Respond to Internet inquiry 0.72989 0.01572 0.000 2.075
Respond to ﬁrst phone call 1.00893 0.01351 0.000 2.743
An observation is a decedent*funeral home (N=160,703). The dependent variable is the estimated funeral home ﬁxed eﬀect from the ﬁrst
stage regression. Funeral homes not reporting price information were excluded. Cremation price is instrumented for using the distance
to the principal subcontracting crematory. MSA ﬁxed eﬀects were also included as regressors (not reported).
Table 14
Cremation Provider Choice: Baseline Specification
Provider Fixed Effects Coeﬃcient Robust Std. Error P-value Odds Ratio
Distance to Cremation Provider -0.0779 0.0046 0.000 0.925
Cremation Provider Owns
Competitor Funeral Home -0.8853 0.4641 0.056 0.413
N 177,850
Prob > χ2 0.0000
Pseudo-R2 0.5682
Provider*Quarter Fixed Effects
Distance to Cremation Provider -0.0838 0.0048 0.000 0.920
Cremation Provider Owns
Competitor Funeral Home -0.8706 0.4773 0.066 0.419
N 177,850
Prob > χ2 0.0000
Pseudo-R2 0.5920
An observation is a funeral home*crematory*quarter, and the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the crematory was the
principal supplier to the funeral home in the quarter. Fixed eﬀects were included as indicated. Robust standard errors, clustered by
funeral home, are reported. A crematory was considered to belong to a competitor ﬁrm if the ﬁrm owns a funeral home located within
ﬁve miles of the unintegrated funeral home in the given quarter. Reported Pseudo-R2 are McFadden’s R2
43Table 15
Cremation Provider Choice: Flexible Specification
Coeﬃcient Robust Std. Error P-value Odds Ratio Mileage Equivalent
Distance to Cremation -0.0786 0.0047 0.000 0.924 -
Provider
Retail Competitor*Number
of Local Wholesale Options
No Crematories -15.903 0.7298 0.000 0 202.4
One Crematory -4.200 0.9258 0.000 0.015 53.5
Two Crematories -2.575 1.0597 0.015 0.076 32.8
Three Crematories -0.435 0.8921 0.626 0.647 5.5
More than Three -0.0282 0.4714 0.952 0.972 0.4
An observation is a funeral home*crematory*quarter, and the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the crematory was the
principal supplier to the funeral home in the quarter (N=177,850). Provider ﬁxed eﬀects are included and all non-exclusive Minnesota
crematories are in the choice set. Reported P-values are calculated using robust standard errors, clustered by funeral home. Retail
Competitor*Number of Local Wholesale Options is a vector of regressors obtained by interacting competitoru,r,t from the baseline
speciﬁcation with a vector of indicators for the number of local non-exclusive crematories. A crematory is considered to be local if it is
located within 25 miles of the funeral home. Pseudo-R2 is 0.5727. Implied transportation cost is $11.40 per mile. The absolute magnitude
of the interaction term is decreasing in the number of wholesale contracting options available to the funeral home, suggesting that costs
associated with using a retail market competitor are greater in areas with less intense wholesale competition. This general pattern
is consistent with foreclosure by integrated crematories. The speciﬁcation was repeated allowing travel cost to diﬀer across wholesale
classiﬁcations and a similar trend was observed (results not reported).
Table 16
Estimated Wholesale Markups
All Markups Bottom 90%
Provider Fixed Effects Mean Median Mean Median
All Crematories 199.64 169.77 179.94 166.91
Independent 239.71 207.63 213.56 193.31
Integrated 188.59 165.52 171.87 161.04
external sourcers 231.30 220.12 219.18 216.21
internal sourcers 156.55 150.30 151.67 148.69
Provider*Quarter Fixed Effects
All Crematories 180.91 148.02 157.32 143.98
Independent 233.95 178.35 187.18 172.28
Integrated 166.28 140.72 149.69 138.63
external sourcers 207.51 201.33 196.40 191.74
internal sourcers 133.92 125.56 128.61 124.68
An observation is a crematory*quarter (N=763). All markups are derived from the baseline speciﬁcation. The magnitude of markups
follows organizational form. Independent crematories have the highest markups followed by primarily external sourcers. Predominantly
internal sourcers have the lowest markups. A crematory is considered to be an external sourcer (deﬁned quarterly) if at least 70 percent
of cremated bodies originate from funeral homes outside of the ﬁrm. An internal sourcer is a crematory for which at least 70 percent of
cremated bodies come from within the ﬁrm. Exclusive dealing crematories are not included (43 crematories are represented here).
44Table 17
Counterfactual: Wholesale Market
Estimated No Competitor Term(s)
Wholesale Markups κ = 0
Baseline Specification Mean Median Mean Median
All Crematories 199.64 169.77 197.50 174.52
Independent 239.71 207.63 222.53 197.23
Integrated 188.59 165.52 190.60 169.08
Flexible Specification
All Crematories 212.33 180.00 205.80 182.37
Independent 262.59 211.49 225.27 211.22
Integrated 198.46 175.27 200.42 176.84
An observation is a crematory*quarter (N=763). Markups were calculated using estimated parameters (including ﬁxed eﬀects) from the
provider ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation using the entire choice set. Probabilities were recalculated imposing the constraint that κ = 0 for the







Retail Markup 1416.03 67
Marginal Cost 669.22 33
Wholesale Price Paid + ξr 187.63 11
Transportation Cost, γ dist(u,r) 171.73 9.0
Competitor Aversion, κcompetitoru,r,t 0 0.0
Cost of Providing Retail Services, retcostfunint,t 180.25 11
Integrated Funeral Homes
Retail Price 2095
Retail Markup 1726.26 79
Marginal Cost 389.91 21
Transportation Cost,γ dist(e,ec) 159.66 7.6
An observation is a funeral home which provided retail cremation services for at least one body during Quarter 3 of 2006. Only funeral
homes with available retail price data and an identiﬁed cremation supplier are included (unintegrated N=204, integrated N=116). Costs
are calculated using actual (versus predicted) supplier choices. Markups are obtained using the baseline provider*quarter ﬁxed eﬀect
speciﬁcation. Median values are reported. The average price across all funeral homes in the ﬁrm was used in the case of multi-brand ﬁrms,
so the prices do not coincide directly with those reported earlier. The median value of each cost component was determined in isolation
of the median value of marginal costs, so cost components may not sum to the reported marginal cost exactly. Unintegrated ﬁrms are
indexed by funint and integrated ﬁrms are indexed by fint. In calculating retail markups for integrated funeral homes, crcostfint,t was
assumed to be $50 and retcostfint,t was assumed to be the median value for unintegrated funeral homes, $180.25.
45Table 19
Counterfactual: Retail Market
Actual ∆[Model - Counterfactual]
Mean Median Mean Median
Funeral Homes Facing Wholesale Monopoly
Retail Price 2387 2525 93.61 128.54
Quantity 5 4 0 0
Marginal Cost 202.53 259.46
Transportation Cost 253.75 158.39
Wholesale Price Paid + ξr -87.26 -34.82
Funeral Homes Facing Wholesale Duopoly
Retail Price 2228 2500 79.33 81.80
Quantity 10 9 -1 -1
Marginal Cost 161.00 166.36
Transportation Cost 64.79 16.86
Wholesale Price Paid + ξr 68.20 115.05
All Unintegrated Funeral Homes
Retail Price 2132 2086 5.43 0.15
Quantity 7 5 0 0
Marginal Cost 10.96 0.31
Transportation Cost 5.33 0.00
Wholesale Price Paid + ξr 3.97 0.13
An observation is an unintegrated funeral home*quarter. A funeral home is considered to face a Local Monopoly wholesale market if
there is one crematory located within a 25 mile radius of the funeral home and it is owned by a competitor (N=43). A funeral home
is considered to face a Local Duopoly wholesale market if there are two crematories located within a 25 mile radius and at least one
is owned by a competitor (N=135). The counterfactual is determined using the the provider ﬁxed eﬀect, ﬂexible kappa speciﬁcation.
Diﬀerences in expected values for the model and counterfactual are reported. Although all retail prices are as of Spring 2007, retail price
statistics are diﬀerent for all quarters versus quarter 3 2006 since funeral home entry and exit is considered.
46Table 20
Cremation Provider Choice: Limited Wholesale Price Data
All Quarters Quarter 3, 2006
Coeﬃcient Odds Ratio Coeﬃcient Odds Ratio
Wholesale Price 0.0003 1.000 -0.0019 0.998
(0.0011) (0.0013)
Distance to Cremation Provider -0.0605‡‡ 0.941 -0.0787‡‡ 0.924
(0.0036) (0.0059)
Integrated Crematory -0.6464‡‡ 0.524 -0.7280‡‡ 0.483
(0.1309) (0.1876)
Cremation Provider Owns -1.2877‡ 0.276 -1.6838‡ 0.186
Competitor Funeral Home (0.4064) (0.5339)
N 146,919 7,380
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo-R2 0.4533 0.5186
An observation is a crematory*funeral home*quarter, and the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the crematory was the
principal supplier to the funeral home in the quarter. Standard errors are in parentheses. Provider ﬁxed eﬀects are included. For the
All Quarters speciﬁcation, reported standard errors are robust, clustered by funeral home. All non-exclusive Minnesota crematories
are included in the choice set. Since wholesale price proxies are not observed for all crematories, the number of observations does not
correspond with previous regressions. A crematory was considered to belong to a competitor ﬁrm if the ﬁrm owns a funeral home located
within ﬁve miles of the unintegrated funeral home in the given quarter. Reported Pseudo-R2 are McFadden’s R2. ‡‡ signiﬁcant at
α = 0.001, ‡ signiﬁcant at α = 0.01
479 Figures
Figure 1: Cremation Services Industry Structure
Three types of ﬁrms participate in the market for cremation services: integrated ﬁrms (funeral homes and crematories), unintegrated
ﬁrms (funeral homes), and independent crematories. Firm boundaries are shaded, and crematories are denoted by triangles. Consumers
(circles) pay retail price, p, to funeral homes (rectangles) that either belong to integrated ﬁrms or are unintegrated. Unintegrated funeral
homes purchase wholesale cremation services from either integrated ﬁrms or independent crematories. The wholesale price, known as the



























































































































































































































Figure 2: Deaths by Method of Disposition
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: Cremation Consumer Travel
An observation is a cremated decedent dying in the third quarter of 2006. Distance is measured in miles. Predictably, the distribution






























































































































































































































Figure 5: Basic Services Prices
On average, unintegrated funeral homes charge approximately the same for immediate burial and direct cremation. The median price
charged for direct cremation by integrated funeral homes is about the same as that charged by unintegrated funeral homes, but integrated














































































































































































































Figure 6: Basic Services Prices
Since pricing decisions are generally made at the ﬁrm level, one marker may represent multiple establishments for multi-establishment
ﬁrms. Wide pricing dispersion is suggestive of product diﬀerentiation, either in terms of horizontal diﬀerentiation by location or diﬀeren-
tiation in perceived quality. In general, funeral homes belonging to vertically-integrated ﬁrms charge less for cremation relative to burial,









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 7: Crematory Body Sourcing
An observation is an integrated crematory*quarter. Conditional on being integrated, an average of 61.8 percent (median 65.9 percent)
of bodies processed by a crematory are sent by same-ﬁrm funeral homes. The histogram on the right displays composition for integrated
crematory*quarters with high output (90th percentile, or 138 bodies). Among high output crematories, some primarily process bodies































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 8: Unintegrated Funeral Home Supplier Choice
Estimated crematory choice probabilities are plotted against distance to the crematory by integration status. Surfaces are obtained using
local mean smoothing (with value n=50). Predicted crematory choice probabilities are from the provider ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation using
the unrestricted choice set. Conﬁdence intervals (95 percent) are shaded. At close distances, independent crematories are 35 percent
more likely to be selected than integrated competitors, with the diﬀerence decreasing with distance.

















































































































































































Figure A1: Quarterly Crematory Operation































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A2: Quarterly Funeral Home Establishment Operation
The plot on the left displays the number of funeral home establishments operating by quarter using the death certiﬁcates to deﬁne dates
of operation. The plot on the right accounts for exits that were discovered to be false during the price survey. Although there was some
entry and exit, the total number of funeral homes was relatively stable.
55Table A1
Probit: Method of Disposition Choice
Marginal Std. Error Z P-value
Eﬀect
Female -0.00873 0.00323 -2.71 0.007
Age (omitted: 71-75)
Under 18 -0.01048 0.01626 -0.64 0.519
18-24 -0.07452 0.01329 -5.61 0.000
25-40 -0.00756 0.00915 -0.83 0.409
41-60 0.05928 0.00556 10.66 0.000
61-65 0.04435 0.00675 6.57 0.000
66-70 0.01315 0.00613 2.15 0.032
76-80 -0.02390 0.00500 -4.78 0.000
Over 80 -0.08195 0.00444 -18.45 0.000
Education (omitted: Less than high school)
Some high school 0.13806 0.00517 26.72 0.000
High school grad 0.16504 0.00361 45.69 0.000
Some college 0.18857 0.00437 43.19 0.000
College grad 0.24944 0.00457 54.62 0.000
Unknown -0.06582 0.00904 -7.28 0.000
Race (omitted: White, non-Hispanic)
Black -0.15899 0.00702 -22.65 0.000
Hispanic -0.08720 0.01345 -6.48 0.000
Asian -0.02943 0.01392 -2.11 0.035
Native American -0.15962 0.00980 -16.29 0.000
Marital Status (omitted: Married)
Divorced 0.16427 0.00444 37 0.000
Never married 0.02033 0.00463 4.39 0.000
Widowed -0.01850 0.00324 -5.71 0.000
Unknown 0.07502 0.04364 1.72 0.086
Military service
Yes 0.02491 0.00357 6.99 0.000
Unknown 0.04667 0.03894 1.2 0.231
Place of death (omitted: Residence)
Board and care home -0.01651 0.02985 -0.55 0.580
Hospital -0.03447 0.00323 -10.68 0.000
Hospice 0.01219 0.00918 1.33 0.184
Nursing home -0.03641 0.00344 -10.58 0.000
Supervised living facility 0.03296 0.01817 1.81 0.070
Other -0.03272 0.00604 -5.42 0.000
Autopsy
Yes 0.01364 0.00530 2.57 0.010
Unknown -0.00870 0.02092 -0.42 0.678
Manner of death (omitted: Natural causes)
Accident 0.02221 0.00679 3.27 0.001
Homicide -0.09945 0.01959 -5.08 0.000
Suicide 0.11599 0.01151 10.08 0.000
Other, unknown 0.01831 0.02240 0.82 0.414
Birthplace (omitted: Minnesota)
US, non-MN 0.08828 0.00286 30.9 0.000
Outside US 0.05100 0.00724 7.05 0.000
Unknown 0.07484 0.02573 2.91 0.004
This table reports the results of a probit of the disposition decision using decedents from all quarters. The dependent variable is one if
the decedent was cremated. Pseudo-R2 = 0.0638. The probability of choosing cremation is increasing in education. Minorities are less






current prices on website 12 2.7 4.3
responded to online inquiry 95 21.4 34.2
no response to online inquiry 171 38.6 61.5
Total Online 278 62.8
Telephone Contacts
responded to ﬁrst call 238 53.7 71.7
responded to subsequent calls 68 15.3 20.5
no information provided 26 5.9 7.8
Total Called 332 74.9
Unreachable 4 0.9
Total in Operation 443
Pricing information was obtained for 93.2 percent of funeral homes that were in operation as of the third quarter of 2006. Funeral homes
that had an internet presence but did not respond to online inquiry were subsequently contacted by phone.
57Table A3
Robustness: Retail Market Size
Competitor Radius
Baseline Specification 2 miles 5 miles 7 miles
Distance to Cremation Provider -0.0773‡‡ -0.0779‡‡ -0.0789‡‡
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0047)
Cremation Provider Owns -0.7961 -0.8853* -1.0808‡
Competitor Funeral Home (0.6177) (0.4641) (0.4014)
N 177,850
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo-R2 0.5673 0.5682 0.5699
Flexible Specification
Distance to Cremation Provider -0.0781‡‡ -0.0786‡‡ -0.0798‡‡
(0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0048)
Retail Competitor*Number
of Local Wholesale Options
No Crematories -15.5312‡‡ -15.9030‡‡ -16.2283‡‡
(0.8057) (0.7298) (0.5557)
One Crematory -4.1878‡‡ -4.2002‡‡ -2.1195‡
(0.9277) (0.9258) (0.6855)
Two Crematories -3.0918† -2.5749† -3.1365‡
(1.4354) (1.0597) (1.0298)
Three Crematories -0.3156 -0.4353 -0.4890
(1.1015) (0.8921) (1.3834)
More than Three 0.5669 -0.0282 -0.4336
(0.5426) (0.4714) (0.4481)
N 177,850
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo-R2 0.5730 0.5727 0.5731
This table reports crematory choice model estimates using various radii to deﬁne a competitor in the retail market. Provider ﬁxed
eﬀects were included in all regressions, and all non-exclusive Minnesota crematories in operation were included in the choice set. Robust
standard errors, clustered by funeral home, are reported in parentheses. The results are qualitatively similar across retail market size
radii. ‡‡ = signiﬁcant at 0.001, ‡ = signiﬁcant at 0.01, † signiﬁcant at 0.05; *signiﬁcant at 0.056
58